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NOTE 
The Constitutionality of Employer-Accessible Child Abuse 
Registries: Due Process Implications of Governmental 
Occupational Blacklisting 
Michael R. Phillips 
INTRODUCTION 
Every state has enacted legislation authorizing governmental inter-
vention into the traditionally sacrosanct domain of the family in order 
to protect children from abuse. 1 The comprehensiveness of these laws 
reflects the seriousness and pervasiveness of this country's child abuse 
problem.2 As part of this offensive, most states have established com-
prehensive indexes of their received child abuse reports known as child 
abuse registries. These registries actually originated in municipal gov-
ernments, 3 but state governments quickly adopted them as well. 4 
State child abuse registries proliferated during the early 1970s,5 
1. See, e.g., Child Protection Act of 1987, CoLO. REv. STAT. §§ 19-3-301 to -316 (Supp. 
1992); Children and Family Services Act, 20 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 505/1-505/41 (1992); Missouri 
Child Protection and Reformation Act, Mo. REV. STAT.§§ 210.110-.189 (1986 & Supp. 1992); 
Child Protective Services Act, N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§§ 411-428 (McKinney 1992). 
2. Recent data collection studies show between 1.4 and 2.2 million reported cases of child 
abuse and neglect annually. Based on these figures, between 22.6 and 34 children in every 1000 
suffer maltreatment each year. VERNON R. WIEHE, WORKING WITH CHILD ABUSE AND NE-
GLECT 19-23 (1992). These statistics exclude unreported cases of child maltreatment, and other 
methodology indicates that the actual incidence of abuse may be substantially higher. Some 
studies have fixed the proportion of children suffering from parental physical abuse at 620 per 
1000. Id. at 18 (citing Murry A. Straus & Richard J. Gelles, Societal Change and Change in 
Family Violence from 1975 to 1985 as Revealed by Two National Surveys, 48 J. MARRIAGE & 
FAM. 465, 469 (1986)). In addition, public opinion surveys have found that as many as 38% of 
women report experiencing sexual abuse as children. Id. at 16 (citing DIANA E. RUSSELL, THE 
SECRET TRAUMA 61 (1986)). Aside from physical injury, child abuse can cause cognitive and 
learning impairment, language delay, disturbed interpersonal behavior, distorted social percep-
tions, lowered self-esteem, emotional problems, self-abusive behavior, and criminal proclivities. 
TIMOTHY J. IVERSON & MARILYN SEGAL, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 86-109 (1990). See 
generally MARGARET A. LYNCH & JACQUELINE ROBERTS, CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD ABUSE 
(1982); RAYMOND H. STARR & DAVID A. WOLFE, THE EFFECTS OF CHILD ABUSE AND 
NEGLECT (1991) (describing consequences and effects of child abuse). 
3. Denver, Los Angeles, and New York City established central registries in 1964, and Cin-
cinnati and Milwaukee followed in 1965. Douglas J. Besharov, Putting Central Registers to 
Work: Using Modem Management Information Systems to Improve Child Protective Services, 54 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 687, 689 (1978). 
4. California, Illinois, Virginia, and Maryland all instituted central registries between 1965 
and 1966. Id. 
5. Id. at 689-90. 
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spurred by the urgings of commentators and child abuse specialists.6 
Currently, forty states and the District of Columbia maintain such 
listings.7 
Originally, child abuse registries had quite limited goals. Experts 
viewed the registries' function as aiding doctors and social service 
workers in detecting child abuse and providing researchers with statis-
tical data. 8 Since their inception, however, registries have evolved into 
tools of crime prevention as well as crime detection. Social service 
agencies now use them to identify a class of child abusers and isolate 
these individuals from potentially harmful contact with children.9 
This change in the use of child abuse registries has serious ramifica-
tions for child care workers who may be listed in them. 10 
When states make their child abuse registries available to employ-
6. See, e.g., Brian G. Fraser, Towards a More Practical Central Registry, 51 DENV. L.J, 509 
(1974). 
7. See ALA. CoDE § 26-14-8 (1992); ALAsKA STAT.§ 47.17.040 (1990); ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 12-12-505 (Michie Supp. 1991), as amended by Act of Apr. 14, 1993, 1993 Ark. Acts 1088; 
CAL. PENAL CoDE § 11170 (West Supp. 1993); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 19-3-313 (Supp. 1992); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. 17a-101(g) (1992); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 16, § 905(c) (Supp. 1992); D.C. 
CoDE ANN.§ 6-2111 (1989); FLA. STAT. ch. 415.504(4)(a) (1992); GA. CODE ANN.§ 49-5-181 
(Michie 1990); HAW. REv. STAT. § 350-2(c) (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 16-1623(c) (Supp. 
1993); 325 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5n.7 (1992); IOWA CODE § 235A.14 (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN 
§ 38-1520 (1986); MD. FAM. LAW CoDE ANN. § 5-714 (1991); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, 
§ 51F (Law. Co-op. 1975 & Supp. 1993); MICH. CoMP. LAWS§ 722.627(1) (1992); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 43-21-257(3) (1993); Mo. REv. STAT. § 210.145.2 (Supp. 1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
718 (1989); NEV. REv. STAT.§ 432.100(1) (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 169-C:35 (1990); 
N.J. REv. STAT. § 9:6-8.11 (1993); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 422(1) (McKinney 1992); N.C. 
GEN. STAT.§ 7A-552 (1989); N.D. CENT. CoDE § 50-25.1-05.5 (Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2151.42.l(F) (Anderson Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 846(D) (Supp. 1993); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 418.765(1) (1991); 23 PA. CoNS. STAT. § 6331 (Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 42-72-7(a) (1988); s.c. CoDE ANN. § 20-7-680 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS ANN.§ 26-8A-10 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 37-1-408 (Supp. 1992); TEX. FAM. CODE 
ANN.§ 34.06 (West 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4916 (1991 & Supp. 1992); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 63.1-248.7(K.) (Michie 1993); WYO. STAT. § 14-3-213 (1986); Act of May 12, 1993, § 11, 1993 
Ind. Acts 142 (to be codified at IND. CODE § 31-6-11-12.l(a)) (registry must be "fully opera-
tional" by June 30, 1994); Act of June 10, 1993, § 1, 1993 La. Acts 505 (to be codified at LA. 
CHILDREN'S CODE art. 616(A)). 
8. See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE TO THE PRESIDENT AND CON-
GRESS OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC LAW 93-247, THE CHILD 
ABUSE PREVENTION AND TREATMENT ACT 13-14 (1975); Besharov, supra note 3, at 690; Fra-
ser, supra note 6, at 510-11. · 
9. Compare Besharov, supra note 3, at 695 and Fraser, supra note 6, at 510-11 and Monrad 
G. Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of the Legislation, 61 CoLUM. L. REV. I, 25 
(1967) (reflecting an early view ofregistries' purpose) with Patrick T. Beaty & Mary R. Woolley, 
Child Molesters Need Not Apply: A History of Pennsylvania's Child Protective Services Law and 
Legislative Efforts to Prevent the Hiring of Abusers by Child Care Agencies, 89 DICK. L. REV. 669, 
670 (1985) (discussing 1984 amendment to Pennsylvania's registry law) and Walter E. Forehand, 
Are New Procedures Correction Enough for Florida's Child Abuse Registry Statute?, 18 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REv. 371, 373 (1991) ("[T]he reporting system is intended to identify children who have 
been harmed in the home and to prevent further harm."). 
10. This Note defines a child care worker as any employee whose job involves direct contact 
with children. This definition includes teachers, camp counselors, and any person employed at a 
child care or day care facility, even in a noncaretaking capacity. 
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ers and potential employers, as many do, 11 child care workers risk dis-
ciplinary action and foreclosure of employment opportunities if they 
are identified as child abusers.12 Thus, by maintaining an employer-
accessible child abuse registry, a state indirectly may deprive its citi-
zens of important liberty and property interests based on the loss of 
employment and reputation. Such consequences necessarily raise the 
issue of whether the state action violates the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.13 
This Note discusses the due process implications of permitting em-
ployer access to state child abuse registries when disclosure affects reg-
istry members' employment. Part I describes the operation of child 
abuse registry statutes and applies selected registry statutes to a hypo-
thetical case to illustrate the standards and procedures they employ. 
It also examines the constitutional challenges that child care workers 
have brought against employer-accessible registry statutes. Part II ex-
amines how the courts have applied the Due Process Clause to various 
other forms of governmental blacklisting, including the loyalty-secur-
ity program, debarment from government contracting, and the denial 
of professional and business licenses. Part II also demonstrates that 
the courts consistently have held governmental occupational restric-
tions to due process scrutiny and argues that courts should apply simi-
lar standards to the analogous constitutional issues that employer-
accessible child abuse registries raise. Part III assesses the constitu-
tionality of current child registry statutes by identifying the protected 
interests involved and applying the three-part test of Mathews v. 
Eldridge. 14 Part III concludes that permitting employer access to 
state child abuse registries impinges upon blacklisted child care em-
ployees' protected property interests in employment and upon the lib-
erty interest in employment that all child care workers possess. By 
weighing the three factors of the Mathews test - the private interests 
of the affected workers, the government's interest, and the risk of error 
- this Part further concludes that many employer-accessible child 
abuse registries violate the Due Process Clause. Part IV proposes spe-
cific procedural protections that states should provide before they may 
constitutionally disclose the contents of a child abuse registry to pri-
vate employers. With these procedural safeguards, states can remedy 
the constitutional defects in child abuse registry statutes and balance 
their legitimate interest in protecting children from abuse with the 
constitutional rights of child care workers. 
11. See infra text accompanying notes 33-38. 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 46-48. 
13. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV,§ 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law"). 
14. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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I. CHILD ABUSE REGISTRIES 
This Part explains how state child abuse systems typically operate 
and the role that registries play in those systems. It also illustrates the 
inability of many child abuse reporting and investigation methods to 
screen accurately the reports they receive and surveys the resulting 
constitutional challenges. Section I.A describes how states handle 
child abuse reports and notes variations between states when appropri-
ate. This section also explains the access policies that states follow 
with respect to their child abuse registries. Section I.B presents a hy-
pothetical case to show how state agencies may construe innocent con-
duct as child abuse and how these governmental conclusions can 
result in loss of employment in states that provide employers access to 
the state child abuse registry. Section I.C describes courts' mixed rul-
ings in cases challenging the constitutionality of child abuse registry 
statutes. 
A. Child Abuse Registry Procedures 
Although registries are firmly established weapons states use to 
combat child abuse, their role and function differ from state to state. 
These variations result not only from divergence in the statutes them-
selves, but also from differences in the way state agencies maintain and 
deploy their registries. 15 In lieu of surveying each of the forty-one 
child abuse registry statutes currently in force, this section describes 
how state child abuse systems typically function, based primarily on 
the laws of Colorado, Illinois, Missouri, New York, and Pennsylvania. 
This depiction notes some of the differences in state laws but unfortu-
nately obscures many others. It is a generalization of the various state 
laws, not an expression of their uniformity. 
1. Establishment and Recording 
Central registries are created by statute and placed under the au-
thority of an administrative agency, usually the department of youth 
or family services.16 The names of accused child abusers find their 
way onto the central registry in several ways. In some states, the reg-
istry directly receives the initial report of abuse. 17 The registry then 
dispatches the relevant information to the investigative arm of the re-
15. See Besharov, supra note 3, at 691, 706. While few states still keep their registries in 
shoeboxes as Besharov describes, contemporary variations likely involve whether the registcy is 
computerized and the sophistication of the database used. 
16. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-3-313 (Supp. 1992); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.7 
(1992); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.145.2 (Supp. 1992); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 422(1), 424(2) 
(McKinney 1992). 
17. See, e.g., 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7 (1992); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 422(2)(a) (McKin-
ney 1992). 
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sponsible state agency or to local child protective authorities. 18 In 
other jurisdictions, local child protection units or law enforcement 
agencies receive the original report and then make a report to the cen-
tral registry. 19 In both cases, reports of child abuse reach the central 
registry unfiltered; individuals' names appear prior to any substantia-
tion of the claims made against them. 20 
2. Investigation of Report 
Child abuse statutes require the state's child protection agency to 
investigate all child abuse reports, usually within twenty-four hours of 
receipt.21 Frequently, state laws mandate deadlines for completion of 
the investigation in order to ensure expeditious treatment of child 
abuse claims.22 This investigation focuses on determining whether the 
report is "indicated," a standard typically defined as whether "some 
credible evidence of the alleged abuse or maltreatment exists."23 Once 
an agency uncovers such evidence, it designates the report as "indi-
cated" in the child abuse registry.24 
3. Expungement 
Nearly every state has procedures whereby subjects of its child 
abuse registry can request that their names be expunged. 25 In some 
cases, though, the subject's ability to request expungement lapses after 
a relatively brief period of time. This creates only a short window 
18. See, e.g., 325 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 517 (1992); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 422(2)(b) (McKin-
ney 1992). 
19. See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-307(1) (Supp. 1992); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:6-8.11 
(1993). 
20. Some states do limit their abuse registries to substantiated reports. See, e.g., OR. REv. 
STAT. § 418.765(1) (1991) (providing that Children's Services Division will report to the registry 
only when an investigation has shown "reasonable cause to believe" that abuse has occurred); 23 
PA. CoNs. STAT. § 6331(2) (Supp. 1993) (including only founded and indicated reports on the 
registry); S.C. ConE ANN. § 20-7-680(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992) (providing that "[r]eports of 
child abuse and neglect must be maintained on the registry in one of four categories: Suspected, 
Unfounded, Indicated, or Affirmative Determination"). This Note discusses the adequacy of 
these standards at infra text accompanying notes 50-52. 
21. See, e.g .• 325 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/7.4(2) (1992); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.145.6 (1986); 
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 424(6) (McKinney 1992). 
22. See, e.g., 325 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/7.12 (1992) (period can be extended for 30 days if 
"good cause" is shown); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 424(7) (McKinney 1992) (60 days). 
23. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 412(12) (McKinney 1992); cf. 325 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/3 (1992) 
(adopting "credible evidence" standard). 
24. In those states that require a report to be indicated prior to its inclusion on the registry, 
these events trigger its initial entry. See supra note 20. 
25. See, e.g., CoLO. REv. STAT. § 19-3-313(7) (Supp. 1992); 325 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/7.16 
(1992); IOWA CoDE § 235A.19(2) (Supp. 1992); MICH. CoMP. LAWS§ 722.627(3) (1992); N.Y. 
Soc. SERV. LAW§ 422(8) (McKinney 1992); 23 PA. CoNS. STAT.§ 6341(A)(2) (Supp. 1993). 
This right accrues, however, only after the state has completed its investigation and, in some 
states, has designated the report "indicated," so the accused remains on the registry while the 
state agency investigates. 
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during which an individual can alter his status on the registry.26 If the 
state agency refuses an expungement request, the subject may seek a 
hearing. While the state generally bears the burden of proof, 27 this 
burden entails proving only that "some credible evidence" supports 
the classification.28 Child abuse statutes are generally silent on such 
matters as the right to counsel and the right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses.29 In fact, some statutes prevent the agency 
from disclosing accusers' identities or any information that would re-
veal their identities. 30 Moreover, the laws do not require a neutral 
arbiter to preside over the hearing. The subject presumably retains a 
right to judicial review of the hearing officer's decision,31 but courts 
likely will defer to the administrative decision. 32 
4. Access to Child Abuse Registries 
The scope of access to a state's child abuse registry is a crucial 
factor in due process analysis. 33 State statutes have taken three differ-
ent stances on employer access to child abuse registries. The first posi-
tion is essentially no position at all: several statutes defer regulation of 
access to the state agency that administers the registry.34 Other states 
strictly limit access to their registries and deny access to employers.35 
26. See, e.g., 325 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/7.16 (1992) (60 days); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW 
§ 422(8)(a)(i) (McKinney 1992) (90 days). 
27. See, e.g., CoLO. REv. STAT.§ 19-3-313(7)(a) (Supp. 1992); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.16 
(1992); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 422(8)(b)(ii) (McKinney 1992). 
28. The statutes typically permit expungement only upon a finding that the record "is inac· 
curate or it is being maintained in a manner inconsistent" with the statute. COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 19-3-313(7)(a) (Supp. 1992); see also 325 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/7.16 (1992); N.Y. Soc. SERV. 
LAW § 422(8)(a)(i) (McKinney 1992). Because these laws authorize the state to maintain an 
individual's name on its registry if there exists "some credible evidence" of abuse, the state's 
burden entails merely proving this fact. 
29. Administrative regulations of the child protection agency may confer these rights, but it 
is significant that states have not established them by statute. For a discussion of the importance 
of confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses and the presence of counsel in child abuse 
determination proceedings, see infra sections IV.D and IV.G, respectively. 
30. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 210.150 (Supp. 1992). 
31. At least one state statute explicitly provides a right to judicial review. See low A Com; 
§ 235A.19(3) (1992). 
32. Most state administrative procedure acts mandate judicial deference to administrative 
decisions. See, e.g., 735 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/3-110 (1992). 
33. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (holding that government assertions about an 
individual cannot form the basis of a due process violation unless they are publicized). 
34. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-10l(g) (1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 905(c) (Supp. 
1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-1.4 (1992); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51F (Law. Co-op. 
1975 & Supp. 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 432.120 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:35 
(1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.770(2) (1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8A-12 (1992); 
TEX. FAM. CooE ANN.§ 34.08 (West Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.8 (Michie 1993); 
Act of June 10, 1993, § 1, 1993 La. Acts 505 (to be codified at LA. CHILDREN'S CODE art. 
616(A)). 
35. ALASKA STAT.§ 47.17.040 (1990); D.C. CODE ANN.§ 6-2113 to -2114 (1989 & Supp. 
1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-185(a) (1990); IDAHO CODE § 16-1623(f) (Supp. 1993); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 38-1520(e) (1986); Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-714(c) (1991); Miss. CODE 
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Finally, a significant number of states allow access only to specified 
parties, including some types of employers. 36 A handful of states 
within this third group take employer access a step further by requir-
ing child care employers to consult the child abuse registry before hir-
ing a prospective employee.37 
Because they preclude employer access, the second category of 
statutes raises no due process issues within the scope of this Note.38 
The due process ramifications for the first class of statutes depend 
upon whether the state agency's rules permit employer access. Only 
statutes in the last category - those that permit access to specified 
employers - facially implicate the due process issues that are the sub-
ject of this Note. 
B. Child Abuse Registry Statutes Exemplified 
This section presents a hypothetical false accusation of child abuse 
and examines how the child abuse systems of two states, Missouri and 
Pennsylvania, would handle such a report. This hypothetical, which 
mirrors the facts of an actual case, 39 describes the operation of child 
abuse registries in more salient terms than section I.A and highlights 
ANN.§ 43-21-261 (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 7A-552 (1989); N.D. CENT. CooE § 50-25.1-11 
(1989); OHIO REV. CoDE ANN. § 2151.42.l(H)(l) (Anderson Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, 
§ 846(E) (Supp. 1993). 
36. ALA. CoDE § 26-14-S(d) (1992); ARK. CoDE ANN. § 12-12-506 (1992); CAL. PENAL 
CoDE § 11170 (West Supp. 1993); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-120 (Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. 
415.51 (1992), as amended by Act of May 12, 1993, 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 214 (effective Oct. 1, 
1993); 325 ILL CoMP .. STAT. 5/11.1 (1993); IOWA CoDE § 235A.15 (Supp. 1992), as amended 
by Act of May 3, 1993, §§ 3-4, 1993 Iowa Legis. Serv. 79 (West); MICH. CoMP. LAWS 
§ 722.627(1) (1992); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.150.1 (Supp. 1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-726 
(Supp. 1992); N.J. REv. STAT.§ 9:6-8.lOa(b) (1993); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 422(4) (McKin-
ney 1992), as amended by Act ofJuly 26, 1993, § 3, 1993 N.Y. Laws 441 (effective Apr. 1, 1994); 
23 PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN.§ 6344 (Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 42-72-S(b) (Supp. 1992); S.C. 
CoDE ANN. § 20-7-690(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992), as amended by South Carolina Child Fa-
tality Review and Prevention Act, § 11, 1993 S.C. Acts 158; TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-408(b) 
(Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4919 (Supp. 1992), as amended by Act of June 21, 1993, 
§ 7, 1993 Vt. Laws 100; WYO. STAT. § 14-3-214(b),(f) (1993); Act of May 12, 1993, § 11, 1993 
Ind. Acts 142 (to be codified at IND. CoDE § 31-6-11-12.l(F)). All of these states provide access 
only to child care employers, and some permit employer access only when the alleged incident of 
abuse occurred in the course of the accused's employment. None allow general employer access 
to their child abuse registries. 
37. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 43-20-8(3) (1993); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 424-a (McKinney 
1992), as amended by Act of July 26, 1993, §§ 4-7, 1993 N.Y. Laws 441 (effective Apr. l, 1994), 
and Act of July 6, 1993, § 2, 1993 N.Y. Laws 203; cf. 23 PA. CoNS. STAT. § 6344 (Supp. 1993) 
(mandating indirect employer access by requiring applicants for child care positions to obtain a 
report from the abuse registry and submit it to prospective employers). 
38. However, other types of due process claims (that is, not employment related) may arise 
out of the maintenance of child abuse registries. See Glasford v. New York State Dept. of Social 
Servs., 787 F. Supp. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (involving claim that membership on the child abuse 
registry damaged protected interest in family relationships); cf. Bohn v. County of Dakota, 772 
F.2d 1433 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 1014 (1986) (involving claim that state's finding 
of child abuse violated protected liberty interest in family privacy without procedural due 
process). 
39. Bohn, 772 F.2d at 1433. 
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the difficulties that child abuse investigators face in discriminating be-
tween truthful and inaccurate child abuse reports. Again, a caveat is 
in order. The child abuse registries of the two states surveyed in this 
section are among the most accessible in the nation. While not all 
child abuse systems permit so much employer access, most do display 
the procedural inadequacies that this section describes. 
1. Missouri 
Alan Woodrow works as a supervisor at Little Lambs, a private 
day care center in Springfield, Missouri. While breaking up a fistfight 
between his two sons at the family home, Alan throws his younger 
child to the ground and injures the boy's shoulder. At the hospital, 
the Woodrow boy tells the treating physician that his father caused the 
injury by hurling him to the ground. The doctor also notices bruises 
on the boy's body and a laceration on his lip, which the child asserts 
his brother inflicted. Believing that he has "reasonable cause to sus-
pect" child abuse, 40 the doctor complies with his statutory duty by 
calling the state's telephone hot line and reporting Alan for child 
abuse.41 
Under Missouri law, when the central registry receives the doctor's 
allegations it must enter Alan's name on the registry as a suspected 
child abuser.42 The Missouri Division of Family Services, which 
maintains the registry, informs its local office in Springfield,43 which in 
turn must commence an investigation within twenty-four hours.44 
There is no time limit for the completion of its investigation, but the 
local office must file a report with the central registry within thirty 
days. 45 In the meantime, Alan's name remains on the registry as a 
suspected child abuser. 
On advice of counsel, Little Lambs submits monthly requests to 
the Division of Family Services to check the child abuse registry for 
information regarding their employees, as the law authorizes them to 
do. 46 On the Friday following the incident at the Woodrow home, 
Little Lambs makes such a request. The Division responds by report-
ing that Alan's name appears on the registry because he is under inves-
tigation for child abuse. Because the division may not identify the 
40. See Mo. REV. STAT.§ 210.115.1(Supp.1992), as amended by Act of May 26, 1993, §A, 
1993 Mo. Legis. Serv. 65 (Vernon) (effective Jan. 1, 1994). 
41. Missouri law requires physicians, among other people, to initiate a child abuse report 
whenever they have "reasonable cause" to suspect abuse or neglect of a child in their care. Mo. 
REv. STAT.§ 210.115.1 (Supp. 1992), as amended by Act of May 26, 1993, §A, 1993 Mo. Legis. 
Serv. 65 (Vernon) (effective Jan. 1, 1994). 
42. Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.145.2 (Supp. 1992). 
43. See Mo. REv. STAT.§ 210.145.4 (Supp. 1992). 
44. Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.145.6 (Supp. 1992). 
45. Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.145.11 (Supp. 1992). 
46. Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.150.6 (Supp. 1992). 
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alleged victim, 47 it informs Little Lambs only that the report alleges 
physical abuse. Continuing the employment of a suspected child 
abuser could subject the children at the facility to possible harm, jeop-
ardize Little Lambs' license, and expose it to negligence liability.48 
Thus, moral and legal considerations compel Little Lambs to termi-
nate or suspend Alan's employment at the center. 
Of course, if the Division finds no evidence of abuse or neglect, it 
will cease to release Alan's name to his employer.49 The disposition of 
his case is different, however, if the Division determines that there is 
merely "reason to suspect abuse."50 Because Missouri law defines 
abuse as "any physical injury . . . inflicted on a child other than by 
accidental means by those responsible for his care, custody and con-
trol,"51 the injuries that motivated the report in the first place could 
create a reason to suspect abuse. Nothing prevents the Division from 
simply disbelieving the Woodrow family's accounts of a fight between 
the boys, especially because there were no outside witnesses. Alan has 
few formal opportunities to defend himself under the statute. He may 
seek judicial review, but only after the Division has completed its in-
vestigation. 52 Meanwhile, the Division may notify Little Lambs that 
the allegations against Alan have been indicated. At this point, Little 
Lambs likely would take action against Alan. 
2. Pennsylvania 
Alan's experience would be similar if this incident were to occur in 
Pennsylvania rather than Missouri. There are some important differ-
ences, however, in the laws of the two states. First, unlike in Missouri, 
where judicial review constituted Alan's only recourse, in Penn-
sylvania Alan can request expungement of his name from the registry 
at any time. 53 If the Secretary of Public Welfare denies this request, 
Alan is entitled to an appeal hearing before the Secretary or a desig-
47. Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.150.6 (Supp. 1992). 
48. See Broderick v. King's Way Assembly of God Church, 808 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 1991); 
Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 748 (Ct. App. 1992); Kimberly 
M. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 263 Cal. Rptr. 612 (Ct. App. 1989); Stropes v. Heritage 
House Childrens Ctr. of Shelbyville, Inc., 547 N.E.2d 244 (Ind. 1989); Worcester Ins. Co. v. 
Fells Acres Day Sch., Inc., 558 N.E.2d 958 (Mass. 1990); w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 33, at 203, n.1 (5th ed. 1985 & Supp. 1988); RE.sTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213(b) cmt. d (1958); Day-Care Co-Owner Faces Civil Lawsuits, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Apr. 14, 1992, at SC. 
49. However, the Division will retain the information it collects for five years, presumably in 
case Alan is reported again at a later date. Mo. REv. STAT. § 210.152.1 (Supp. 1992). 
so. Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.152.2 (Supp. 1992). 
51. Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.110.6 (Supp. 1992). 
52. Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.152.3 (Supp. 1992). 
53. See 23 PA. CoNs. STAT.§ 6341(A)(2) (Supp. 1993). The only grounds for expungement, 
however, are that the information is inaccurate or is being maintained in a manner inconsistent 
with the statute. 23 PA. CoNS. STAT. § 6341(C) (Supp. 1993). 
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nated hearing officer.54 Pennsylvania applies a "substantial evidence" 
standard to determine whether a child abuse report should be listed on 
the central registry as "indicated."55 Although this standard is more 
stringent than the "some credible evidence" standard that Missouri 
uses, it nevertheless falls short of the preponderance of the evidence 
standard employed in most civil cases. Pennsylvania law also differs 
from Missouri law because it requires administrators of child care fa-
cilities to check the child abuse registry before hiring a new em-
ployee56 and forbids them from hiring those whose names are attached 
to "founded" reports. 57 
Alan would enjoy more procedural protections if child abuse alle-
gations arose in Pennsylvania rather than Missouri, but the impact of 
those procedural protections on his employment would change little. 
Although Alan could receive a hearing in which the Secretary would 
bear the burden of proof, 58 the mere fact of physical injury and the 
admission that Alan caused the harm probably establish "substantial 
evidence" of child abuse. Even the fairest of hearings may not exoner-
ate Alan under this standard. The statute guarantees that Alan will be 
identified as a child abuser to all prospective child care employers. 59 
Even if Alan's case is not "founded," such a disclosure effectively will 
foreclose his employment in the field. 
C. Child Abuse Registry Litigation 
The reported case law includes a handful of due process challenges 
to state child abuse registry laws. These claims have yielded varying 
results. In both Valmonte v. Perales 60 and Angrisani v. City of New 
York, 61 New York district courts held that individuals stated a cause 
of action under section 198362 based on the violation of their due pro-
cess rights when their membership on the New York child abuse regis-
try deprived them of employment. In both cases the plaintiffs had 
been accused of physically abusing minors, 63 and the Department of 
Social Services classified the reports as "indicated." The Department 
54. 23 PA. CoNS. STAT. § 634l(C) (Supp. 1993). 
55. 23 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 6303 (Supp. 1993). 
56. 23 PA. CoNS. STAT. § 6344(B)(2) (Supp. 1993). 
57. 23 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 6344(C) (Supp. 1993). A "founded" report of child abuse is one 
verified by a judicial finding. 23 PA. CoNS. STAT.§ 6303 (Supp. 1993). 
58. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 634l(c) (Supp. 1993). 
59. Those employed before the statute took effect on January 1, 1986 are not subject to its 
employer access provisions. 23 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 6344(k) (Supp. 1993). 
60. 788 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
61. 639 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). 
62. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1988). 
63. Valmonte allegedly struck her 11-year-old daughter in the face; Angrisani allegedly as-
saulted a resident at the wayward boys' home where he worked. Valmonte, 788 F. Supp. at 748; 
Angrisani, 639 F. Supp. at 1329. 
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expunged Angrisani's report after a lengthy delay, 64 but, after granting 
V almonte a hearing, refused to expunge her report. 65 The causation 
issue also differed in the two cases; while Angrisani's employer tenni-
nated him due to his listing on the registry,66 Valmonte claimed only 
that the listing of her name prevented her from obtaining a position 
working with children. 67 Despite these differences, both courts held 
that the state action deprived the plaintiffs of protected liberty inter-
ests68 and that the procedures employed raised sufficient constitutional 
questions to withstand a motion to dismiss. 69 
In Glasford v. New York State Department of Social Services, 10 
however, the district court rejected a due process challenge to New 
York's registry statute. The plaintiff in Glasford was also the subject 
of an indicated report of child abuse entered on the registry.71 Unlike 
the other New York plaintiffs, he alleged no adverse effects to his em-
ployment status. Rather, he claimed that the Department's action in-
terfered with protected liberty interests in his reputation and in his 
relationship with his family.72 The court held that the complaint 
stated no violation of a protected interest and that, in any case, the 
Department had granted Glasford all the process that was due by pro-
viding an expungement hearing.73 Consequently, the court granted 
the defendant's motion to dismiss.74 
The Sixth Circuit also rejected a child abuse registry related due 
process claim in Tingle v. Tennessee Department of Human Services. 15 
Tingle, a day care center employee, was accused of sexually molesting 
a child at the center where he worked. 76 The Department of Human 
Services classified this report as "indicated"77 and, pursuant to its ad-
ministrative rules, granted Tingle an immediate ex parte file review.78 
The Department then forbade Tingle's employer from reinstating him 
64. The Department entered its decision over a year after the alleged abuse was reported. 
639 F. Supp. at 1329-30. 
65. 788 F. Supp. at 749. 
66. 639 F. Supp. at 1330. Because Angrisani lived at the group home, being labeled a child 
abuser cost him his residence as well. 639 F. Supp. at 1330. 
67. 788 F. Supp. at 749. 
68. In both cases, the court found that the disclosure to employers or prospective employers 
violated a liberty interest in reputation. 788 F. Supp. at 751-52; 639 F. Supp. at 1333. 
69. 788 F. Supp. at 752-53; 639 F. Supp. at 1334-35. 
70. 787 F. Supp. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
71. 787 F. Supp. at 386. 
72. 787 F. Supp. at 387. 
73. 787 F. Supp. at 388-89. 
74. 787 F. Supp. at 389. 
75. No. 88-5035, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 16533 (6th Cir. Dec. 6, 1988) (unpublished 
opinion). 
76. Tingle. 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 16533, at *1-2. 
77. 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 16533, at *3. 
78. 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 16533, at *7. 
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from his leave of absence, and the day care center fired him. 79 
Although the court avoided the constitutional issues by deciding the 
case on other grounds, 80 the court nevertheless reviewed the state's 
emergency notification procedures and found them to comply with the 
Due Process Clause. 81 
These somewhat divergent holdings are not entirely irreconcilable. 
Glasford is clearly distinguishable from the other New York cases be-
cause the plaintiff there alleged no employment-related injury arising 
from his presence on the registry. Likewise, Tennessee's procedures 
are particularly elaborate, 82 far exceeding the procedural safeguards 
provided in New York and in most other states.83 The courts clearly 
disagreed, though, on the constitutional adequacy of New York's pro-
cedural scheme, with the Glasford court finding constitutional the 
same provisions that Angrisani and Valmonte held possibly to violate 
the Due Process Clause. 84 Though divergent holdings exist, these 
cases support the proposition that permitting employer access to child 
abuse registries raises serious due process concerns, but they do not 
settle the issue. 
II. GOVERNMENTAL BLACKLISTING AND THE 
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
Employer-accessible child abuse registries are but one form of gov-
ernment blacklisting. 85 While the term blacklist carries pejorative 
connotations, state restriction of employment· is in fact an important 
and widely accepted aspect of the police power that often serves im-
portant public purposes. 86 Blacklists are not inherently constitution-
ally suspect, but courts have recognized that the Due Process Clause 
places both substantive and procedural limitations on their use. 87 This 
79. 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 16533, at *3. 
80. The court held that, by failing to object to a magistrate's recommendation upholding the 
constitutionality of the Department's action, Tingle had waived his right to have his due process 
claim heard on appeal. 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 16533, at *7. 
81. 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 16533, at *7-8. 
82. Under the Tennessee Child Sexual Abuse Act, an alleged child abuser whose employ-
ment involves contact with children receives an immediate ex parte file review prior to the dis-
semination of any information to his employer. Subsequently, the accused may request an 
administrative hearing and has a right to judicial review of the outcome. 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 
16533, at *6-7. 
83. See supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text. 
84. Compare Valmonte, 788 F. Supp. at 752-53 and Angrisani, 639 F. Supp. at 1334-35 with 
Glasford, 787 F. Supp. at 388-89. 
85. See infra text accompanying notes 90-98, 149-56. 
86. See, e.g., infra note 153 (citing statutes). 
87. See, e.g., Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (holding that 
rejection of bar applicant violated procedural due process); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 
353 U.S. 232 (1957) (holding that state board's grounds for rejecting applicant violated substan-
tive due process); Transco Sec., Inc. v. Freeman, 639 F.2d 318 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
820 (1981); Old Dominion Dairy Prods., Inc. v. Secretary of Defense, 631 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 
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Part argues that the due process principles that restrain these pro-
grams apply with equal force to states' use of child abuse registries as 
employment blacklists. 
This Part describes the approaches that courts have taken in as-
sessing the constitutionality of governmental occupational restrictions 
and how these approaches apply to employer-accessible child abuse 
registries. Section II.A describes several different forms of blacklisting 
that have come under due process scrutiny. Section II.A.1 discusses 
cases arising out of the loyalty-security programs instituted by the fed-
eral government during the 1950s and early 1960s. Section II.A.2 fo-
cuses on debarment of government contractors, section II.A.3 deals 
with revocation or denial of business licenses, and section II.A.4 ad-
dresses occupational licensing. Section II.B illustrates the parallels be-
tween these programs and employer-accessible child abuse registries, 
and it argues that the Due Process Clause requires procedural protec-
tions similar to those that courts have imposed on other forms of 
blacklisting. 
A. Forms of Blacklisting 
Governmental occupational restrictions assume many forms, but 
this section discusses only four. Included in this list is probably the 
most infamous example of governmental blacklisting in American his-
tory: the loyalty-security programs of the Cold War era, commonly 
described as an element of McCarthyism. Most types of blacklisting 
are far less notorious, though. In fact, the government frequently im-
poses restraints upon businesses and other commercial entities similar 
to those the loyalty-security programs placed upon individuals. 
Through debarment, the federal government refuses to deal commer-
cially with private business entities because of alleged malfeasance in 
past transactions, 88 and by denying or revoking business licenses the 
government controls participation in a variety of markets. 89 The state 
also customarily imposes occupational restrictions on individual citi-
zens through occupational licensing. Although these programs use 
1980) (holding that government procedures used in debarment of contractor violated the Due 
Process Clause); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964) (holding that rejection ofliquor 
license application violated Due Process Clause); Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955) 
(holding that U.S. Coast Guard violated Due Process Clause in barring seamen from service on 
private merchant vessels). 
88. These cases almost exclusively involve government contracting. See, e.g., ATL, Inc. v. 
United States, 736 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Transco, 639 F.2d at 318; Old Dominion, 631 F.2d 
at 953; Myers & Myers, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 527 F.2d 1252, 1259-60 (2d Cir. 1975); 
Horne Bros. v. Laird, 463 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. 
Cir. 1964); Art-Metal - USA, Inc. v. Solomon, 473 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1978). 
89. The issuance of liquor licenses is a prominent example. See Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Good-
win, 662 F.2d 88 (1st Cir.), affd. en bane on other grounds, 662 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1981), affd. sub 
nom. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th 
Cir. 1964). 
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different methods, in all of them the government creates criteria for 
membership in a particular market and uses its power to exclude those 
not conforming to these requirements. 
1. The Loyalty-Security Programs 
Like employer-accessible child abuse registries, the loyalty-security 
programs of the early Cold War era collected reports of citizen misbe-
havior and used the administrative process to exclude reported indi-
viduals from particular employment positions where they could harm 
governmental interests. The term loyalty-security programs encom-
passed a series of statutes and executive orders that conditioned public 
employment and some forms of private employment90 on the em-
ployee's loyalty to the United States and avoidance of "subversive" 
activities.91 President Truman established the first major component 
of the loyalty-security apparatus by executive order in 1947. He de-
clared disloyalty to be cause for dismissal from government employ-
ment and created a Loyalty Review Board within the Civil Service 
Commission (Loyalty Board). The President assigned the Loyalty 
Board the mission of determining whether there were any "reasonable 
grounds" to distrust the loyalty of any federal servant.92 Several fed-
eral agencies also established their own loyalty boards, which had 
original jurisdiction over personnel security matters arising within that 
agency.93 
Loyalty board adjudications contained few procedural protections 
for the accused. These boards often relied on secret informants, whose 
identities sometimes remained unknown even to the boards them-
selves. The proceedings usually barred accused citizens from review-
ing the board's evidence of their disloyalty, from confronting or cross-
examining the witnesses against them, or even from knowing the wit-
nesses' identities.94 Usually, the boards provided a hearing, but they 
90. See Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); 
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955); see also 
ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 96-102 (1954). 
91. See generally ELEANOR BONTECOU, THE FEDERAL LoYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM 
(1953); RALPH S. BROWN, LoYALTY AND SECURITY EMPLOYMENT TESTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES (1958); JOHN L. O'BRIAN, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 27-42 
(1955). 
92. In 1953 President Eisenhower replaced the "reasonable grounds for belief" standard 
with a mandate to determine whether the hiring or retention of any individual would "be clearly 
consistent with the national security." O'BRIAN, supra note 91, at 31. Observers interpreted this 
change as tightening of the government's loyalty requirements. Id. 
93. See BROWN, supra note 91, at 61-91. 
94. See Greene, 360 U.S. at 478-81; Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 335-37 (1955); see also 
Peters, 349 U.S. at 350-52 (Douglas, J., concurring) (condemning government's use of "faceless 
informers" and general procedural inadequacy of hearing); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. 
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179-80 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing case of Dorothy 
Bailey); BoNTEcou, supra note 91, at 60-66; Kenneth C. Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-
Type Hearing, 70 HARV. L. REv. 193, 233-43 (1956). 
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sometimes failed to employ this safeguard. 9s 
The Attorney General's list of subversive organizations formed an-
other important component of the government's loyalty-security pro-
gram. Like the loyalty boards' determinations, the list was prone to 
inaccuracy and abuse due to a lack of procedural safeguards. The At-
torney General defined "subversive" in a vague and flexible manner 
that essentially left its application to his discretion.96 Moreover, the 
Attorney General could base his findings of subversive activity on 
"any information, secret or otherwise, which might come into the pos-
session of the executive department."97 Placement on the list had dev-
astating effects not only upon the organization itself, but upon its 
members as well. 98 
The Supreme Court exhibited substantial unwillingness to subject 
federal loyalty-security programs to constitutional scrutiny.99 In 
every case brought before it, the Court either overturned the result on 
a nonconstitutional ground or asserted that the case presented no con-
stitutional claim.100 For instance, in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Com-
mittee v. McGrath, 101 several organizations challenged on due process 
grounds the Attorney General's refusal to substantiate his determina-
tion that these groups were subversive. The Court, while admitting 
that the case would have "bristled with constitutional issues" if the 
alleged behavior had arisen from the executive order, 102 refused to ad-
dress these issues. Instead, it overturned the Attorney General's ac-
tions as exceeding the authority of the applicable executive order. 103 
The Court used the same rationale in Peters v. Hobby 104 to invalidate 
95. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 
886 (1961). 
96. See BoNTEcou, supra note 91, at 159-73; see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm., 341 
U.S. at 176-77 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("These flexible standards ... are weapons which can be 
made as sharp or blunt as the occasion requires .••. When we employ them, we plant within our 
body politic the virus of the totalitarian ideology which we oppose."). 
97. BoNTEcou, supra note 91, at 160. 
98. See Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 445-47 (1954) (describing Barsky's loss of 
his medical license resulting from membership in blacklisted organization); Joint Anti-Fascist 
Refugee Comm., 341 U.S. at 161 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing consequences of inclu-
sion on Attorney General's list to organizations themselves). 
99. See Davis, supra note 94, at 233 ("Few vital legal problems have been kept for so long in 
such even balance."). 
100. The Court was little more forthcoming in ruling on the due process implications of state 
loyalty-security programs. See Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960); Beilan v. 
Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958). But see Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) 
(striking down, on due process grounds, state loyalty oath required for public employment); cf 
Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (holding that the Due Process Clause 
precluded termination of a college professor for invocation of Fifth Amendment rights against 
self-incrimination). 
101. 341 U.S. 123 (1950). 
102. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm., 341 U.S. at 135. 
103. 341 U.S. at 138. 
104. 349 U.S. 331 (1955). Peters involved a Yale University professor whom the Loyalty 
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an act of the Loyalty Board while avoiding the constitutional implica-
tions of the claim.1os 
Greene v. McElroy 106 and Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers 
Union, Local 473 v. McElroy 107 both concerned private sector employ-
ees whose terminations resulted from the government's revocation of 
their security clearances on grounds of disloyalty.108 The Court again 
avoided determining whether loyalty-security programs provided due 
process of law.109 In Greene the Court held that the Board's action 
violated an executive order, 110 and in Cafeteria Workers the Court 
found no constitutionally protected interest in working on a naval base 
and, therefore, no entitlement to Due Process Clause protection.111 
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Parker v. Lester 112 presents the 
most complete analysis of the constitutionality of a federal loyalty-
security program. In Parker, the Coast Guard had excluded a group 
Board had barred from public service because of alleged Communist Party associations. The 
Board refused to reveal the sources of its information or permit confrontation or cross-examina-
tion of these secret witnesses. 
105. Peters, 349 U.S. at 342-43. The Court held that the Board had violated Executive Or-
der 9385 by hearing appeals of agency loyalty board rulings favorable to the accused, rather than 
just those adverse to the employee, and by adjudicating cases on its own motion. Contemporary 
co=entators recognized the Court's reluctance to wade into the constitutional mire on ques-
tions of national security. See Davis, supra note 94, at 233 ("The view is widely held that the 
Supreme Court dodged the issue of the validity of the loyalty program in[Peters]. where the issue 
was nicely drawn."). 
106. 360 U.S. 474 (1959). 
107. 367 U.S. 886 (1961). 
108. Petitioner Greene had been the vice president of a manufacturing company whose busi-
ness was primarily government contracting work. The Board's revocation of his security clear-
ance made him virtually useless to his employer and resulted in his discharge. 360 U.S. at 481-
82. The Court also found it relevant that the Board's action prevented him from obtaining any 
job consistent with his training as an aeronautical engineer. 360 U.S. at 475. The petitioner in 
Cafeteria Workers was a short-order cook employed by a private catering company who was 
denied admission to the navy factory where the company had assigned her. The government 
gave no reason for this prohibition and denied her any form of hearing. 367 U.S. at 888. For an 
excellent description of the impact of the loyalty-security programs on private sector employees, 
see BERLE, supra note 90, at 83-109. 
109. Commentators have suggested that the Court's reticence to challenge the constitutional-
ity of loyalty-security programs stemmed from political pressure. The Court reportedly feared 
that Congress would restrict its jurisdiction over loyalty-security cases. See Edward L. Rubin, 
Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044, 1059 n.73 (1984). 
110. Greene, 360 U.S. at 507-08. Here, the Court presumed that the executive order did not 
authorize proceedings that failed to comport with standards of fair procedures, so that any such 
proceedings violated it. 
111. 367 U.S. 886 (1961). This holding represents the invocation of the right-privilege dis-
tinction, which held a variety of employment-related interests to be outside the scope of the Due 
Process Clause because they were privileges granted gratuitously by government, rather than 
rights inherent in the concept of citizenship. See Davis, supra note 94, at 233-36; Rubin, supra 
note 109, at 1058. The Court has since abolished the right-privilege distinction. See Board of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 & n.9 (1972) ("[T]he Court has fully and finally rejected the 
wooden distinction between rights and privileges that once seemed to govern the applicability of 
procedural due process rights."). The matter of constitutionally protected interests in employ-
ment is discussed in much greater detail infra in sections 111.A.2 and 111.A.3. 
112. 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955). 
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of seamen from service on private merchant vessels because it was not 
satisfied that their "character and habits of life ... [were] such as to 
authorize the belief that [their] presence ... on board would not be 
inimical to the security of the United States."113 While the govern-
ment provided the barred seamen with a postdeprivation hearing, it 
placed the burden on them to prove the worthiness of their charac-
ter.114 Moreover, the Coast Guard failed to inform the seamen of 
either the information against them or the identities of the govern-
ment's sources. The court held that "this system of secret informers, 
whisperers and talebearers"115 provided the plaintiffs with no due pro-
cess and unconstitutionally abridged their interest in earning a liveli-
hood in one of the common occupations.116 
2. Debarment of Government Contractors 
The federal government is the largest single purchaser of goods 
and services in the country117 and consequently controls the economic 
vitality of many private businesses for whom it is the primary or exclu-
sive customer.118 Naturally, the government has an interest in 
preventing fraud and overbilling, and in maintaining the quality of the 
goods and services that it procures.119 It pursues this interest in part 
through a system of suspension and debarment that bans enterprises 
that allegedly have engaged in misconduct from bidding on govern-
ment contracts for a prescribed period of time. 120 Although the vari-
ous government agencies make their own determinations with respect 
113. Parker, 227 F.2d at 710. A 1950 executive order prohibited seamen from serving on 
American merchant vessels without a certificate from the Coast Guard verifying that they met 
this standard. 227 F.2d at 710. At least one commentator regarded this program as "the strict-
est of all restraints imposed by the federal government upon the freedom of the individual." 
O'BRIAN, supra note 91, at 39. It is also unique, and perhaps distinguishable from other loyalty-
security programs, because it imposes direct government controls on private employment. In this 
way, it is similar to the occupational licensing cases discussed infra in section 11.A.4. 
114. 227 F.2d at 711-12. 
115. 227 F.2d at 719. 
116. 227 F.2d at 720. 
117. Lisa A. Everhart, Note, "Graylisting" of Federal Contractors: Transco Security Inc. of 
Ohio v. Freeman and Procedural Due Process Under Suspension Procedures, 31 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 731, 731 (1982). 
118. See Old Dominion Dairy Prods., Inc. v. Secretary of Defense, 631 F.2d 953, 955 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980) ("[T]he loss of the Government contract work threatened the very existence of the 
business."); Gonzales v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 574 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Art-Metal- USA, Inc. v. 
Solomon, 473 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1978). 
119. See Transco Sec., Inc. v. Freeman, 639 F.2d 318, 322 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 
820 (1981); Everhart, supra note 117, at 731-32. 
120. 41 C.F.R. § 101-45.602 (1992). The distinction between suspension and debarment is 
that the former is a temporary sanction pending a formal determination of whether debarment is 
appropriate, while the latter represents a permanent refusal to deal. Everhart, supra note 117, at 
732-33; Lawrence Shire, Recent Decision, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 90, 93-94 (1981). Because 
courts generally treat the two penalties as indistinct, see Art-Metal, 473 F. Supp. at 5, the term 
debarment encompasses both forms of exclusion in this Note. 
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to debarment and "nonresponsibility,"121 one agency's conclusions 
will circulate throughout the government and will generally prevent 
the contractor from receiving any business from the federal 
government.122 · 
The first actual application of the Due Process Clause to debar-
ment of government contractors occurred in Old Dominion Dairy 
Products, Inc. v. Secretary of Defense. 123 Old Dominion was a corpo-
ration whose business consisted almost entirely of supplying dairy 
products to U.S. military bases.124 Because of a serious misunder-
standing about the terms of one contract, a government auditor deter-
mined that Old Dominion "show[ed] a lack of business integrity."12s 
The Defense Department concluded that the company was 
"nonresponsible" and disseminated this information to the contracting 
officers of at least two military bases.126 As a result, the government 
refused to award Old Dominion two contracts for which it had sub-
mitted the lowest bid.121 Nobody informed the company's officials of 
the allegations regarding the firm's integrity until after the government 
awarded the contracts to other parties.12s 
In analyzing Old Dominion's due process claim, the District of 
Columbia Circuit held first that Old Dominion possessed a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest in freedom from "stigmatizing gov-
ernmental defamation having an immediate and tangible effect on its 
ability to do business."129 It then found that the government had vio-
121. Nonresponsibility is a judgment made by an agency which, though lacking the formal 
characteristics of debarment, justifies the government's refusal to contract with a particular ven-
dor. See Old Dominion, 631 F.2d at 959; Shire, supra note 120, at 108. 
122. See Old Dominion, 631 F.2d at 963-64; 41 C.F.R. § 101-45.601(c) (1992). But see Shire, 
supra note 120, at 108. While Shire argues that nonresponsibility determinations will not neces-
sarily be communicated between government agencies and may not affect contract awards even if 
they are, he acknowledges that, in the case of debarment, the GSA circulates a list of debarred 
companies throughout the government. Id. at 108 n.177. 
123. 631 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The District of Columbia Circuit had previously held 
that the government was required to treat debarred contractors according to principles of "basic 
fairness." Home Bros. v. Laird, 463 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 
570 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Because the reasoning in these cases was "quite similar to a constitutionnl 
due process analysis," Shire, supra note 120, at 95, the actual application of the Due Process 
Clause to debarment actions was a short but significant step. 
124. Old Dominion, 631 F.2d at 956. 
125. 631 F.2d at 956-57. 
126. 631 F.2d at 957-58. 
127. 631 F.2d at 957-59. In both cases the court found that Old Dominion would have been 
awarded the contracts but for the determination of nonresponsibility. 
128. 631 F.2d at 958. 
129. 631 F.2d at 962-63. In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished two Supreme 
Court cases - Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (holding that a refusal to rehire a 
government employee did not implicate a protected interest under the Fourteenth Amendment) 
and Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (holding that injury to reputation alone did not implicate 
a protected liberty interest). The former case was distinguished on the grounds that Old Domin-
ion had been foreclosed from all governmental employment, not just a particular contract, and 
the latter on the grounds that the company had been deprived of employment as well as reputa-
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lated the Due Process Clause by rejecting Old Dominion's two con-
tract bids without first informing it of the nature of the charges or 
providing an opportunity for it to contest the allegations.130 However, 
the court expressly did not require a hearing precedent to debarment. 
Instead, it limited its holding to the principle "that when a determina-
tion is made that a contractor lacks integrity ... notice of the charges 
must be given to the contractor as soon as possible so that the contrac-
tor may utilize whatever opportunities are available to present its side 
of the story before adverse action is taken."131 
Shortly thereafter, the Sixth Circuit decided Transco Security, Inc. 
v. Freeman, 132 a case that raised virtually identical issues. Transco, a 
suspended government contractor, challenged a General Services Ad-
ministration (GSA) regulation permitting the agency to deny it a hear-
ing if such a proceeding "would adversely affect possible civil or 
criminal prosecution."133 Under this regulation, the government 
could suspend Transco for up to eighteen months without any oppor-
tunity to be heard.134 
Relying partially on Old Dominion, the court found that GSA's 
refusal to grant Transco a hearing and to disclose fully the basis for 
the suspension raised "the possibility of a lengthy suspension based on 
mere suspicion, unfounded allegation, and clear error"135 and violated 
the company's due process rights. The Transco court expanded Old 
Dominion by declaring that the Due Process Clause requires "notice of 
the charges, an opportunity to rebut those charges and, under most 
circumstances, a hearing,"136 prior to debarment. The court did not, 
however, order GSA to provide Transco a hearing but required GSA 
only to make a more complete disclosure of the evidence of Transco's 
malfeasance to the company.137 
3. Denial of Business Licenses 
The state also effectively can "blacklist" a business by denying or 
revoking its license. Licensing is necessary for a significant and ex-
tion. 631 F.2d at 963-66. For criticism of the court's reasoning, see Shire, supra note 120, at 
108-09. Roth and Paul, along with the issue of protecting due process interests, are discussed at 
length infra in section 111.B. 
130. 631 F.2d at 967. 
131. 631 F.2d at 968. 
132. 639 F.2d 318 (6th Cir.), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 820 (1981). 
133. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-4(e) (1992). 
134. Transco, 639 F.2d at 320. Other applicable regulations provided the Justice Depart-
ment with 12 months in which to initiate a criminal prosecution and allowed it to apply for a six-
month extension. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-2 (1992). 
135. 639 F.2d at 324. 
136. 639 F.2d at 321. 
137. 639 F.2d at 325. 
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paneling number of businesses to operate, 138 and, as the scope of li-
censing has grown, so has the state's ability to "allow[ ] the death 
sentence to be imposed upon a lawful business."139 Hornsby v. Al-
len 140 exemplifies the constitutional limitations on governmental li-
censing powers.141 The City of Atlanta had rejected Homsby's 
application for a liquor license even though she had met all of the 
official requirements.142 Atlanta provided Hornsby with no reason for 
her rejection and no opportunity to contest the findings.143 She al-
leged that Atlanta actually based selection on political factors instead 
of on these official criteria.144 The court held that these allegations, if 
proven, constituted arbitrary conduct which derogated the plaintiff's 
due process rights. 145 While conceding that "the state has the right to 
regulate or prohibit traffic in intoxicating liquor," the court asserted 
that this right "is something quite different from a right to act arbi-
trarily and capriciously."146 
The Hornsby court believed that the licensing process required a 
variety of procedural safeguards to ensure substantive fairness. It held 
that the Due Process Clause entitled the plaintiff to a full hearing, an 
opportunity to know the objective standards she had to meet to obtain 
a license and the city's evidence that she had failed to meet these stan-
dards, and an opportunity to subject this evidence to cross-examina-
tion.147 The court also would have limited the liquor board findings to 
those that followed from the evidence presented at such a hearing.148 
138. See ERNEST GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL REsTRAINTS 
106 (1956); John R. Rydell II, Note, Due Process Limitations on Occupational Licensing, 59 VA. 
L. REv. 1097, 1098 (1973). Practicing a profession frequently requires obtaining a government 
license. See GELLHORN, supra, at 106. These types of licenses are discussed infra in section 
11.A.4. 
139. Davis, supra note 94, at 266. 
140. 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964). 
141. See Rydell, supra note 138, at 1126-27. 
142. Hornsby, 326 F.2d at 607. 
143. 326 F.2d at 610. 
144. 326 F.2d at 607. Specifically, Hornsby charged that the sponsorship of one or more of 
the aldermen in the ward where the establishment was to be located was in fact necessary to 
obtain a liquor license. 326 F.2d at 607. 
145. 326 F.2d at 610. 
146. 326 F.2d at 609. For other cases finding the procedures used in revoking or denying 
business licenses to violate the Due Process Clause, see Chalkboard, Inc. v. Brandt, 902 F.2d 
1375 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 980 (1990); Wilkerson v. Johnson, 699 F.2d 325 (6th 
Cir. 1983); Blackwell College of Business v. Attorney Gen., 454 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1971); In re 
Carter, 177 F.2d 75 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 900 (1949); Standard Airlines v. Civil 
Aeronautics Bd., 177 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
147. 326 F.2d at 610. 
148. 326 F.2d at 610; see also Rydell, supra note 138, at 1127 (arguing that these procedural 
standards are applicable to all licensing decisions). It is also significant that Hornsby was merely 
a rejected applicant for a liquor license, rather than a licensee whose rights were being revoked, 
in light of the view that due process applies less stringently to members of the former class than 
the latter. See Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1304 
(1975). 
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4. Occupational Licensing 
Although occupational licensing commonly is not regarded as a 
form of blacklisting, the two processes are actually quite similar. 
While licensing presumptively excludes members of the general popu-
lace from an occupation, conventional forms of blacklisting presump-
tively include all practitioners and then eliminate those the agency 
deems unsuited. Thus, the government frames licensing as the grant 
of an exclusive privilege, while blacklisting appears as the denial of a 
right.149 Yet, the two merely constitute different approaches to the 
same objective: restricting unsuited individuals from practicing cer-
tain callings.150 Often simple convenience will determine which form 
a system of occupational screening takes. When the risk of harm to 
the public resulting from occupational misfeasance is relatively low, 
the state finds it more efficient to weed out systematically those who 
have proven themselves unqualified than to endure the arduous ad-
ministrative process of licensing every employee.151 As courts have 
recognized, this difference in approach does not justify a difference in 
the level of due process scrutiny .152 
In many fields, the state exerts formal control over admission to an 
occupation by issuing licenses to those it deems qualified and by mak-
ing unauthorized practice of the profession a criminal offense.153 Li-
censing requirements apply to a great variety of professions.154 States 
typically delegate responsibility for licensing decisions to administra-
tive boards, which often consist of practitioners in that particular 
149. This distinction once had great constitutional significance with respect to licensing but 
since has been discredited. See Davis, supra note 94, at 264-66; Rydell, supra note 138, at 1100-
02; see also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 & n.9 (1972); Schware v. Board of Bar 
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957); William Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege 
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968). 
150. The thin distinction between licensing and blacklisting becomes clear when licensing 
systems become so inclusive that denial of a license seems like a denial of a right rather than a 
privilege. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver's license). 
151. In the case of child care employees, licensing of the child care centers themselves ren-
ders individual licensing less necessary. This creates strong incentives for centers to regulate and 
screen their employees stringently because employee misfeasance can jeopardize their license. 
152. See Phillips v. Vandygriff, 711 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 
(1984) (recognizing government blacklisting as a "de facto licensing" scheme and subjecting it to 
the same constitutional standards as occupational licensing); see also Bannum, Inc. v. Town of 
Ashland, 922 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1990); Phillips v. Vandygriff, 724 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984). 
153. See, e.g., Dental Practice Law of Colorado, CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 12-35-101 to -202 
(1991 & Supp. 1992) (dentists and dental hygienists); Illinois Architecture Practice Act of 1989, 
225 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 305/1-305/40 (1992) (architects); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 333.010-.265 
(1988) (embalmers and funeral directors); N.Y. Eouc. LAW §§ 6520-6532 (McKinney 1985 & 
Supp. 1993) (physicians). 
154. Licensed occupations include "egg-graders and guide-dog trainers, pest controllers and 
yacht salesmen, tree surgeons and well diggers, tile layers and potato growers." GELLHORN, 
supra note 138, at. 106. 
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field. 155 These boards review applicants' qualifications and determine 
which candidates deserve admission. Rejected applicants may seek ju-
dicial review of the boards' decisions.156 
Licensing decisions must meet the mandates of the Due Process 
Clause, 157 but the Supreme Court has vacillated on both the need to 
have particular procedural safeguards and the type of scrutiny applica-
ble to state licensing decisions. 158 Barsky v. Board of Regents 159 repre-
sents the Court's most permissive interpretation of the Due Process 
Clause in the licensing context.160 Barsky, a doctor, was convicted in 
Washington, D.C. of violating a federal statute161 by refusing to pro-
duce certain papers subpoenaed by the House Committee on Un-
American Activities. 162 Subsequently, the New York Board of Re-
gents suspended his medical license for six months. The Court held 
that the Board had wide discretion in determining who should have a 
license to practice medicine.163 Applying this principle, it concluded 
that the Board did not violate due process by basing its decision on a 
criminal conviction in an outside jurisdiction or on the petitioner's as-
sociation with a controversial political group.164 
The Court exhibited a markedly less deferential stance toward 
state licensing decisions in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners. 165 The 
petitioner in Schware was an applicant to the New Mexico bar who 
reported that he had, in the past, used aliases, been arrested on several 
155. Id. at 140; Rydell, supra note 138, at 1100, 1118; see, e.g., Willner v. Committee on 
Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (three-member panel of practicing attorneys); Barsky v. 
Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) (10 doctors constituting Grievance Committee). The 
composition of these boards raises particular problems in assuring neutral adjudication. See 
Rydell, supra note 138, at 1118-20. 
156. See Rydell, supra note 138, at 1128-29. 
157. See Davis, supra note 94, at 262-63; Friendly, supra note 148, at 1297 ("Another cate-
gory ranking high on the procedural scale is the revocation of a license to practice a profes-
sion."); Rydell, supra note 138, at 1103. 
158. Compare Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) with Barry v. Barchi, 443 
U.S. 55 (1979). 
159. 347 U.S. 442 (1954). 
160. Rydell reports that Barsky held a medical license to be a privilege, and therefore unpro-
tected by the Due Process Clause. Rydell, supra note 138 at 1100-01. While the Court did 
categorize the license as a "privilege," Barsky, 347 U.S. at 451, it went on to examine fully the 
petitioner's due process claim. 
161. The act involved was not criminal under New York law. Barsky, 347 U.S. at 452. 
162. Like many of the early licensing cases, Barsky involved the loyalty-security programs 
discussed supra in section II.A.I. See also In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Konigsberg v. 
State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of 
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). 
163. 347 U.S. at 451. 
164. 347 U.S. at 456. Justice Black, writing in dissent, would have held the Due Process 
Clause to require the Board to establish a rational relationship between Barsky's offenses and the 
practice of medicine, rather than exercising "purely personal and arbitrary power." 347 U.S. at 
463 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)). 
165. 353 U.S. 232 (1957); see Rydell, supra note 1:18, at 1101 (remarking that Schware "ex-
emplifies the abandonment of Barsky"). 
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occasions, and belonged to the Communist Party. Based on these ad-
missions and on confidential information that the Board of Bar Exam-
iners had received, the Board refused to allow him to take the bar 
exam on the grounds that he had failed to meet standards of moral 
fitness. 166 The Board declined to reveal this confidential information 
to Schware167 and granted him a hearing in which it called no wit-
nesses and introduced no evidence.168 The Court held that this con-
duct violated the Due Process Clause. It declared, in contrast to 
Barsky, that "[a] State can require high standards of qualification ... 
before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must 
have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to 
practice law."169 Since the suspect events had occurred some fifteen to 
twenty years earlier, the Court felt that the Board reasonably could 
not infer bad moral character from the totality of the evidence.17o 
Schware failed to discuss the procedural due process aspects of li-
censing. The Court filled this vacuum in Willner v. Committee on 
Character and Fitness. 171 The applicant in Willner had spent over 
twenty-five years unsuccessfully seeking admission to the New York 
State Bar. He had passed the bar examination on his first attempt, but 
the State Board of Bar Examiners repeatedly refused to certify him 
because he did not possess "the character and general fitness requisite 
for an attorney and counsellor at law."172 Though the Board con-
ducted several hearings on the issue, it refused to provide Willner with 
the specific reasons for his rejection, to reveal the evidence it harbored 
against him, or to permit an outside referee to evaluate his character 
and fitness. 173 The Court held that the Board's action violated the 
166. Schware, 353 U.S. at 234-35 & n.2. 
167. 353 U.S. at 235 n.2. 
168. 353 U.S. at 236. 
169. 353 U.S. at 239; cf. supra note 160. The outcomes of Barsky and Schware undermine 
Judge Friendly's contention that, for due process purposes, "[r]evocation of a license is far more 
serious than denial of an application for one." Friendly, supra note 148, at 1296. In general, 
there is no indication that the Supreme Court recognizes such a distinction. See Willner v. Com-
mittee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); cf. Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 
1964). 
170. Schware, 353 U.S. at 245-47. 
171. 373 U.S. 96 (1963). Between Schware and Willner, the Court decided two other licens-
ing cases -In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961) and Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961). 
These two cases, decided on the same day, held that denying bar admission to applicants who 
refused to answer certain questions put to them by the licensing board did not contravene the 
Due Process Clause. While these cases represented a slight retrenchment from Schware in their 
substantive respects, neither involved the procedural due process issues decided in Willner. 
172. Willner, 373 U.S. at 100. Willner was actually twice denied a license and five times 
rejected by the courts on various petitions for relief. Aside from his first application to the Bar, 
the Board provided him with no reason at all for these denials. 373 U.S. at 100-01. 
173. 373 U.S. at 100-02. Apparently, the Board did not divulge its reasons or evidence to the 
Court either; the opinion does not reveal any such justifications, and the Justices themselves seem 
rather confused about the Board's true motivations. See 373 U.S. at 109 (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring). Willner claimed that his exclusion resulted from a vendetta by a member of the bar, and 
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Due Process Clause. In its ruling, it stated flatly that "the require-
ments of due process must be met before a State can exclude a person 
from practicing law"174 and held that the Board's authority consisted 
of "a discretion to be exercised after fair investigation, with such a 
notice, hearing, and opportunity to answer for the applicant as would 
constitute due process."175 In this context, the Court held that due 
process attaches a panoply of procedural protections to the licensing 
process, including a full and fair hearing, an opportunity to know the 
Board's evidence and the reasons for its action, and the right to con-
front and cross-examine adverse witnesses.176 
B. Application to Employer-Accessible Child Abuse Registries 
The government programs exhibited in these cases resemble in 
many respects the use of child abuse registries for employment screen-
ing, which Part I described. Each incorporates a procedural scheme 
that affords the accused at most only a postdeprivation hearing in 
front of the governmental entity that made the original adverse find-
ings and conclusions.177 Frequently, the state limits citizens' knowl-
edge of the factual basis of its conclusions.178 In all of these programs, 
as well as in the case of employer-accessible child abuse registries, the 
government may forbid the accused from knowing the identities of the 
accusers and from confronting or cross-examining them. 179 Moreover, 
authorities determine the culpability of the accused according to vague 
standards that are less stringent than those that a court of law would 
apply.180 
These forms of blacklisting also parallel employer-accessible child 
abuse registries in terms of their impact on individual workers and 
corporations. Just as the state prevents child care workers from pur-
suing their livelihoods because of their inclusion in the child abuse 
registry, the government programs described in section II.A deny eco-
nomic actors the right to participate in particular markets based on 
the state's determination of malfeasance. Debarment severs govern-
that at one of his hearings the Board had shown him various adverse statements that lawyer had 
made. 373 U.S. at 101. 
174. 373 U.S. at 102. 
175. 373 U.S. at 103. 
176. 373 U.S. at 104-05. The Court since has reaffirmed and clarified these principles. See 
Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979) (suspension of horse trainer's license). 
177. Compare supra text accompanying notes 27-32, 58-59 with supra notes 97, 116, 127-28, 
137, 158, 174-75 and accompanying text. 
178. Compare supra note 30 and accompanying text with supra notes 97, 104, 115, 130, 137, 
167-68 and accompanying text. 
179. Compare supra text accompanying notes 29-30 with supra text accompanying notes 97, 
115, 168; see also infra text accompanying notes 378-85. 
180. Compare supra text accompanying notes 23, 49-52, 55-56 with supra notes 96, 98, 113-
14, 125-26, 133, 146, 172 and accompanying text. 
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ment contractors from their principal customer. Denial and revoca-
tion of business licenses place a more direct restraint on individual 
market activity by denying the affected party not just the government's 
patronage, but the necessary governmental approval for participation 
in the market. Occupational licensing functions similarly but affects 
individuals rather than commercial entities. The loyalty-security pro-
grams posed the most direct constraints, actually barring certain indi-
viduals from government or government-related employment.181 
Similarly, the state's identification of a child care worker as an alleged 
child abilser not only is likely to lead to termination of employment, 
but also forecloses job opportunities throughout the industry, depriv-
ing accused child care workers of their livelihoods.182 
With the exception of the loyalty-security programs, whose consti-
tutionality the courts never explicitly examined, 183 the clear import of 
the cases described in section I.A is that the right to pursue employ-
ment remains perhaps "the most precious liberty that man pos-
sesses"184 and that the government must comply with the Due Process 
Clause before interfering with it. In the area of debarment, the Old 
Dominion-Transco line of cases185 evinces a judicial willingness to ap-
ply the Due Process Clause to these forms of government blacklisting. 
The holding in Hornsby reflects the constitutional necessity of proce-
dural safeguards in the licensing process and presents a more expan-
sive view of due process requirements than Old Dominion or 
Transco. 186 Schware conclusively demonstrates that the limitations 
state licensing imposes on occupational liberty must conform to the 
dictates of due process. Finally, Willner illustrates that potent proce-
dural safeguards must accompany these vocational restrictions, even 
181. For a description of the impact of the loyalty-security programs on individual employ-
ees comparable to the hypotheticals discussed supra in section I.B, see BERLE, supra note 90, at 
92-95. 
182. See supra note 48 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 266-69. 
183. But see Davis, supra note 94, at 239-40 (suggesting that Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 
(9th Cir. 1955), establishes the unconstitutionality ofloyalty-security programs). Aside from the 
subsequent history of loyalty-security adjudication, see supra text accompanying notes 106-10, 
there is ample reason to believe that Parker does not settle the issue. It is distinguishable from 
the other loyalty-security cases in several ways: (1) the program affected private sector employ-
ment and foreclosed an entire occupational field, so its consequences were unusually broad in 
scope; (2) the procedures provided were so egregiously deficient and biased as to be meaningless 
as a practical matter; (3) the case falls within the line oflicensing cases described infra in section 
11.A.4. See supra note 113. The court in fact compared the seaman in Parker to "an attorney 
who suddenly finds himself disbarred." 227 F.2d at 717. 
184. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
185. Although Old Dominion and Transco are the landmark cases in this area, many other 
courts have held governments to due process standards in their dealings with contractors. See, 
e.g., Berlanti v. Bodman, 780 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1985); ATL, Inc. v. United States, 736 F.2d 677 
(Fed. Cir. 1984); Northeast Ga. Radiological Assocs., P.C. v. Tidwell, 670 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 
1982); Mainelli v. United States, 611 F. Supp. 606 (D.R.I. 1985); Shermco Indus. v. Secretary of 
the Air Force, 584 F. Supp. 76 (N.D. Tex. 1984). 
186. See supra text accompanying notes 123-37. 
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when the exclusion of an individual from a given profession serves 
important public purposes. 
The application of such procedural constraints to other forms of 
blacklisting indicates that similar safeguards are constitutionally pre-
requisite to the individual occupational restrictions embodied in em-
ployer-accessible child abuse registries. As previously illustrated, the 
state's exclusion of child care workers by providing employer access to 
child abuse registries bears a strong resemblance to the occupational 
restrictions scrutinized in the foregoing cases, both procedurally and 
in terms of its impact on the interests of affected citizens. These paral-
lels demonstrate that the Due Process Clause should apply to em-
ployer-accessible child abuse registries as it does to these other 
varieties of governmental blacklisting. 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CHILD A.BUSE REGISTRY 
STATUTES 
This Part uses analysis rather than analogy to assess the due pro-
cess implications of employer-accessible child abuse registries. Proce-
dural due process analysis involves two steps.187 First, the court must 
determine whether the state action caused a deprivation of a constitu-
tionally protected liberty or property interest. 188 Second, it must de-
cide whether the state's procedures meet constitutional due process 
standards, according to the three-part test that the Supreme Court es-
tablished in Mathews v. Eldridge 189 to govern such determinations. 
This Part applies this two-step analysis to employer-accessible child 
abuse registry statutes in order to determine their constitutionality.190 
Section III.A discusses the liberty and property interests upon which 
employer-accessible child abuse registry statutes might impinge. Sec-
tion 111.B applies the three-pronged Mathews v. Eldridge test to these 
statutes. The Part concludes that state child abuse registries that per-
mit employer access intrude upon child care workers' protected liberty 
interests in employment and, in certain circumstances, their protected 
property interests in employment. It further concludes that the proce-
dural protections generally provided to accused child abusers do not 
satisfy due process requirements and result in a constitutional 
violation. 
187. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972). 
188. The Due Process Clause does not protect all forms of individual liberty or all types of 
property interests from improper governmental deprivation. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, 
Of ''Liberty" and ''Property," 62 CoRNELL L. REV. 405 (1977) (discussing the Supreme Court's 
definitions of "liberty" and "property" in the context of the Due Process Clause). 
189. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
190. As discussed supra in section I.A, there exist variations among state statutes, and indi-
vidual analysis of each state's laws is beyond the scope of this Note. Fortunately, the Mathews v. 
Eldridge analysis does not focus on specific procedures, and enough common threads run 
through all the statutes to assemble a general assessment of procedural adequacy. 
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A. Implication of Constitutionally Protected Interests 
To formulate a due process claim, plaintiffs first must demonstrate 
that they possess a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or 
property, and that state action has deprived them of it. 191 At one 
time, courts and commentators generally believed "that every individ-
ual 'interest' worth talking about [was] encompassed within the 'lib-
erty' and 'property' secured by the due process clause and therefore 
entitled to some constitutional protection."192 A series of Supreme 
Court decisions has narrowed the types of interests encompassed by 
these terms, 193 however, apparently with the goal of stemming what 
the Court perceived as an impending avalanche of constitutional tort 
claims.194 As the range of protected interests has narrowed, proof of 
deprivation of a legitimate liberty or property interest has become an 
increasingly prominent aspect of due process claims.195 Releasing the 
names of accused child abusers to employers may impinge upon three 
individual interests: a liberty interest in reputation, a property interest 
in employment, and a liberty interest in employment. This section 
analyzes each of these interests to determine whether the Due Process 
Clause protects them against governmental deprivation. The section 
also discusses whether termination of child care employees due to 
their inclusion in a child abuse registry constitutes state action. 
1. Liberty Interest in Reputation 
In several early opinions, the Supreme Court suggested or implied 
that the Due Process Clause protects an individual's interest in pre-
serving his good name.196 In Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 197 the Court 
appeared to affirm this principle. The case arose out of a Wisconsin 
191. See U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1; supra note 188. 
192. Monaghan, supra note 188, at 406-07. 
193. Id. at 408; see also William Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property'~· Adjudicative 
Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CoRNELL L. REv. 445 (1977); Randolph J. Haines, 
Note, Reputation, Stigma, and Section 1983: The Lessons of Paul v. Davis, 30 STAN. L. REv. 
191, 198-200 (1977). Compare Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (representing earlier, broader 
view of protected interests) with Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) and Paul v. Davis, 424 
U.S. 693 (1976) and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (representing more modem 
and restrictive views). 
194. See Monaghan, supra note 188, at 408-09; Haines, supra note 193, at 195-99. See gen-
erally Christina B. Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L. 
REV. 225 (1986). 
195. See Monaghan, supra note 188, at 443 (asserting that the Court's redefinition of liberty 
and property "result[s] in the creation of a technical barrier" to due process claims). 
196. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 428 (1969) (holding that administrative bodies 
serving an accusatory function must comply with principles of due process); Wieman v. Upde-
graff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952) (discussing "badge of infamy" conferred when an employee is 
dismissed for disloyalty). 
197. 400 U.S. 433 (1971). 
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statute198 that permitted government officials to post notices banning 
the sale of alcohol to citizens they considered to have a drinking prob-
lem.199 Constantineau challenged the constitutionality of her "post-
ing," and the Court held that the statute impinged upon the plaintiff's 
liberty interest in her reputation without procedural due process. 
"Where a person's good name, reputation, honor or integrity is at 
stake," the Court declared, "notice and an opportunity to be heard are 
essential. 'Posting' ... is a stigma, an official branding of a person [by 
the state]. The label is a degrading one. Under the Wisconsin Act, a 
resident ... is given no process at all."200 
Five years later though, in Paul v. Davis, 201 the Court abruptly 
extinguished the liberty interest in reputation that Constantineau ex-
plicitly had recognized. The facts of the two cases were roughly paral-
lel. In Paul the plaintiff's name and photograph appeared on a flyer 
displaying "active shoplifters" that city and county police officers dis-
tributed to local merchants at Christmastime.202 Davis once had been 
arrested for shoplifting, but the court had not decided his case at the 
time that the flyers were distributed and subsequently dismissed it.203 
As in Constantineau, the plaintiff received no notice that he would be 
depicted as a shoplifter and no opportunity to contest this classifica-
tion. Moreover, the flyer soon came to the attention of his employer, 
who ultimately decided not to terminate his employment but warned 
him that he "had best not find himself in a similar situation" in the 
future.204 
Despite the obvious similarity to Constantineau, the Court held 
198. WIS. STAT. § 176.26 (1967) (repealed 1972), discussed in Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 
434. 
199. The statute read, in part: 
(1) When any person shall by excessive drinking of intoxicating liquors, or fermented malt 
beverages misspend, waste, or lessen his estate so as to expose himself or family to want, or 
the town, city, village or county to which he belongs to liability for the support of himself or 
family, or so as to injure his health, endanger the loss thereof, or to endanger the personal 
safety and comfort of his family or any member thereof, or the safety of any other person, or 
the security of the property of any other person, or when any person shall, on account of the 
use of intoxicating liquors or fermented malt beverages, become dangerous to the peace of 
any community, the wife of any such person, [or certain governmental officers], may, in 
writing signed by her, him or them, forbid all persons knowingly to sell or give away to such 
person any intoxicating liquors or fermented malt beverages, for the space of one year and in 
a like manner may forbid the selling, furnishing, or giving away of any such liquors or 
fermented malt beverages, knowingly to such person by any person in any town, city or 
village to which such person may resort for the same. 
Wts. STAT. § 176.26 (1967) (repealed 1972), quoted in Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 434 n.2. 
200. 400 U.S. at 437. 
201. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
202. Paul, 424 U.S. at 694-95. 
203. 424 U.S. at 695-96. Davis was arrested on June 14, 1971. The state arraigned him in 
September of that year, and he pied not guilty. The judge filed away the charge with leave to 
reinstate, which technically left the case open in November of 1972, when authorities printed and 
distributed the flyers. The judge dismissed Davis' case shortly thereafter. 
204. 424 U.S. at 696. 
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that, because "the words 'liberty' and 'property' as used in the Four-
teenth Amendment do not in terms single out reputation as a candi-
date for special protection,"205 no deprivation of a liberty or a 
property interest protected by the Due Process Clause had oc-
curred. 206 While state denigration of a citizen's reputation did not it-
self invade a protected interest, the Court held that the creation of a 
stigma could be subject to due process scrutiny if a plus factor, such as 
"alteration of legal status" or deprivation of "a right previously held 
under state law" accompanied it.207 In Constantineau, the Court ex-
plained, the state action violated due process because it proscribed the 
plaintiff from exercising her right to purchase liquor, which was con-
ferred by state law.2os 
The "stigma-plus" test adopted in Paul surely does more to 
"open[] the constitutional door to state and federal use of official 
blacklists"209 than it does to protect accused child abusers. Under 
Paul, the state's imposition of a stigma or denigration of a citizen's 
reputation by public labeling as a child abuser does not by itself form 
the basis for a due process claim. At minimum, the impingement of 
some other legal status or right conferred by state law must accom-
pany the creation of this stigma in order to impinge upon a constitu-
tionally protected interest.210 The opinion is unclear as to whether 
205. 424 U.S. at 701. The precise meaning of this statement is not apparent, because the 
words 'liberty' and 'property' do not "in terms" single out any particular interest for protection. 
206. 424 U.S. at 711-12. 
207. 424 U.S. at 708-09. 
208. 424 U.S. at 708-09. Professor Monaghan notes that Constantineau's "right" to buy 
alcohol "played an obviously trivial role in the decision of that case." Monaghan, supra note 
188, at 424. Even this characterization borders on overstatement. The Court in Constantineau 
emphasized that "[t]he only issue present here is whether the label or characterization given a 
person by 'posting' •.• [is] such a stigma or badge of disgrace that procedural due process 
requires notice and an opportunity to be heard." Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 
(1971) (emphasis added). The only mention Constantineau made of a right to purchase liquor 
occurred in a long quotation from the district court's opinion. 400 U.S. at 435-36. Indeed, the 
Paul court could produce no direct textual reference to such a right in Constantineau and instead 
relied on the phrase "what the government is doing to him" to establish that Constantineau 
actually hinged on the plaintiff's state-created right to purchase liquor, rather than the protected 
liberty interest in reputation on which the opinion focused. Paul, 424 U.S. at 708 (citing Con-
stantineau, 400 U.S. at 437). 
Commentators have strongly criticized Paul's treatment of Constantineau. See Monaghan, 
supra note 188, at 424 ("The [Paul] Court's re-rationalization of the earlier cases is wholly star-
tling to anyone familiar with those precedents."); Haines, supra note 193, at 192, 220-22 & 
nn.161 & 169; see also Paul, 424 U.S. at 729-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
209. Haines, supra note 193, at 207. 
210. Monaghan, supra note 188, at 424-26. This reading of Paul, which adheres most closely 
to the plain language of the decision, essentially subordinates the constitutional protections of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the laws of the individual states. Basic principles of federalism aside, 
it is indeed "an unsettling conception of 'liberty' that protects an individual against state interfer-
ence with his access to liquor but not with his reputation in the community." Id. at 426. But see 
Thomas J. Stalzer, Note, Reputation as a Constitutionally Protectib/e Interest, 52 NOTRE DAME 
L. R.Ev. 290, 291 (1976). Stalzer interprets Paul's stigma-plus test as holding that in order for 
state defamation to be actionable, a deprivation of an independently protected liberty or property 
interest must accompany the defamation. This view finds support in Paul's statement that some 
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termination of employment would suffice to elevate the reputational 
injury to constitutional recognition. Loss of employment per se does 
not involve any state right that would qualify as a "plus,, factor be-
cause there is no right to specific employment. On the other hand, 
Paul suggests that employment may qualify as a "legal status,, within 
the context of the "stigma-plus,, test.211 In any case, the Court's rul-
ing precludes citizens from basing due process claims on mere injury 
to their reputations. 
2. Property Interest in Employment 
In the context of the Due Process Clause, property encompasses a 
variety of intangible and sometimes unrealized interests212 that do not 
necessarily correspond to traditional definitions of property.213 On the 
other hand, the scope of th~ term is not boundless, especially as it 
pertains to employment.214 
interests which are considered protected forms of liberty or property "attain this constitutional 
status by virtue of the fact that they have been initially recognized and protected by state law." 
Paul 424 U.S. at 710. However, in the context of constitutional adjudication, a stigma·plus test 
so defined necessarily would be meaningless, because if the "plus" in itself supports a constitu· 
tional claim, then the presence of a stigma would have no significance, except perhaps for in-
creasing damage claims in § 1983 actions. A challenged statute either would be found 
constitutional or unconstitutional, and the fact that it implicates two protected interests instead 
of one would have no practical relevance. Since the reputational interest could only attain and 
maintain its status vicariously through the protected interest, it would always be either insuffi-
cient or superfluous to the constitutional claim. See Stalzer, supra, at 298-99. 
211. This ambiguity stems mainly from Paul's discussion of Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 
U.S. 564 (1972). Paul 424 U.S. at 709-10 (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 573). Here, the Paul Court 
quoted Roth to the effect that a simple refusal to rehire an employee does not implicate the Due 
Process Clause unless it places a stigma on the employee that will hinder his prospects of future 
employment. Paul then uses this language to prove precisely the inverse point - that the impo-
sition of a stigma is not actionable unless it involves termination of employment. The Court's 
suggestion that state denigration of reputation combined with the loss of employment creates a 
protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause contradicts its suggestion elsewhere that 
the necessary "plus" factor must be the violation of a separately protected interest or alteration 
of a right conferred by state law. Roth specifically held that mere termination of government 
employment did not interfere with a protected property interest, and it is difficult to see how 
employment can be regarded as a right conferred by state law. This problem has been recognized 
by the courts. Compare Doe v. United States Dept. of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1104-12 (D.C. Cir. 
1985) (holding that discharge or refusal to rehire a government employee constitutes a "plus" 
factor under Paul) with Doe, 753 F.2d at 1129-31 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). See also cases 
cited infra note 235. 
212. The Supreme Court has held "property" to include not only certain employment inter-
ests, but rights in many forms of government largesse. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) 
(driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare payments); Monaghan, supra 
note 188, at 436-38; Robert L. Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: Monitoring Administrative 
Decisions Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 60, 63-64. See generally Charles 
A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
213. See generally CHARLES DONAHUE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 
107-71 (3d ed. 1993) (exploring major theoretical conceptions of "property"). 
214. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (finding no protected property inter-
est in accrued Social Security payments); see also Van Alstyne, supra note 193 (discussing limits 
that the Court has imposed on the definition of property). 
October 1993] Note - Child Abuse Registries 169 
In the landmark case of Board of Regents v. Roth, 215 the Supreme 
Court ruled that a nontenured college professor employed on a year-
to-year basis had no protected property interest in his employment.216 
The Roth Court conditioned constitutional recognition of a property 
interest on possession of "a legitimate claim of entitlement," rather 
than a mere expectation of benefit.217 The most obvious sources of 
this entitlement are tenure agreements, employment contracts prohib-
iting termination except for cause, and state statutes.218 However, em-
ployees can secure property interests in their employment through less 
formal means. In Perry v. Sindermann, 219 a companion case to Roth, 
the Court held that a nontenured teacher possessed a property interest 
in his employment due to language in the Faculty Guide amounting to 
a de facto tenure system.220 Perry further stated that a long-term em-
ployee "might be able to show from the circumstances of [his] service 
- and from other relevant facts - that he has a legitimate claim of 
entitlement to job tenure."221 
Among child care workers, unionized employees and some upper-
level administrators may enjoy contractually created limitations on 
their termination. A clause providing that an employer may fire the 
employee only "for cause" or under specified circumstances should be 
sufficient to create a legitimate claim of entitlement to the job.222 For 
these employees, a state action that affects their employment would 
affect their protected property interests. The vast majority of child 
care workers, however, do not fall into this category. Workers who 
have the most direct contact with the children, and therefore face the 
greatest risk of false accusation of child abuse, are likely to be termina-
ble at will223 and have no legitimate claim to entitlement under the 
Roth-Perry test.224 Hence, these employees can state no property in-
terest which would entitle them to due process protection. 
215. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
216. 408 U.S. at 578. 
217. 408 U.S. at 577. 
218. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (recognizing property 
interest conferred by a state statute setting conditions for termination of civil service employees). 
219. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
220. Perry, 408 U.S. at 600. The provision that the Court relied upon stated: 
Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system. The Administration of the College 
wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent tenure as long as he displays a 
cooperative attitude toward his co-workers and his superiors, and as long as he is happy in 
his work. 
408 U.S. at 600. 
221. 408 U.S. at 602. 
222. See Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1991); Blanton v. Griel 
Memorial Psychiatric Hosp., 758 F.2d 1540, 1542 (11th Cir. 1985). 
223. See, e.g., Angrisani v. City of New York, 639 F. Supp. 1326, 1333 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); see 
also Carol Kleiman, Child Care Workers Find Field is Maturing, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 11, 1992, § 8, 
at 1 (discussing low pay and status of child care workers). 
224. See Angrisani, 639 F. Supp. at 1333; supra text accompanying notes 214-20. 
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3. Liberty Interest in Employment 
Like property, the Supreme Court has given the term liberty a 
broad construction in the due process context. In an early case, the 
Court declared that liberty "denotes not merely freedom from bodily 
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in 
any of the common occupations of life .... "225 This definition formed 
the basis for recognition of an independent, constitutionally protected 
liberty interest in occupation in contemporary procedural due process 
doctrine.226 Not every state action that deprives a citizen of employ-
ment necessarily abridges this interest,227 but action that prevents or 
significantly hinders a person from acquiring any employment in a 
given field does implicate this interest.228 Thus, a termination can vio-
late an individual's liberty interest in employment, even when no pro-
tected property interest exists, if the circumstances surrounding the 
termination tend to foreclose future employment.229 
Two different Supreme Court approaches suggest this result. 
Under its "stigma-plus" test, Paul v. Davis230 essentially held that 
state action that detrimentally affects an individual's reputation can 
infringe a protected liberty interest if and only if it is accompanied by 
the impairment of "some more tangible interest[ ]."231 Some courts 
have held that loss of employment or foreclosure of future employ-
ment possibilities provides the requisite "plus" in this formula.232 The 
225. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1922). 
226. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972); cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
152 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (citing the Meyer definition of 
liberty). 
227. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 575 ("It stretches the concept too far to suggest that a person is 
deprived of 'liberty' when he simply is not rehired in one job but remains as free as before to seek 
another."). 
228. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573; see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 
123, 185 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); Doe v. United States Dept. of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 
1104-05 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that foreclosure of future employment in government service 
and as an attorney due to termination for unprofessional conduct and dishonesty implicates 11 
protected liberty interest); Larry v. Lawler, 605 F.2d 954, 958 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding thnt 
debarment from government employment arising from accusations of abusive behavior and alco-
hol abuse impinges upon a protected liberty interest). But cf. Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562 F.2d 
701, 713-14 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding termination for unsatisfactory job performance and insub-
ordination to be insufficiently stigmatizing to foreclose future employment). Most courts have 
held governmental action that forecloses private employment to the same standard as that which 
forecloses public employment. See Chemin v. Lyng, 874 F.2d 501 (8th Cir. 1989); Phillips v. 
Vandygriff, 711 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984) (holding that stnte 
action that induces private employees' termination and forecloses their future employment im-
pinges upon protected interests, although the government does not directly cause either termina-
tion or foreclosure). 
229. Doe, 153 F.2d at 1106-07. 
230. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
231. Paul, 424 U.S. at 701. For a more detailed description of the "stigma-plus" test, see 
supra notes 205-11 and accompanying text. 
232. See, e.g., Doe, 153 F.2d at 1106. This conclusion stems from Paul's specific mention of 
employment as an interest which could combine with governmental defamation to form a liberty 
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loss of employment or foreclosure of future employment can thereby 
activate a latent liberty interest in reputation. 
In addition, Roth implies an independent liberty interest in pursu-
ing a field of employment. In Roth, the Court distinguished the plain-
tiff's case from one in which the state had "imposed on him a stigma 
or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of 
other employment opportunities."233 Had it done so, the Court em-
phasized, "this ... would be a different case."234 Several courts have 
determined that, if the stigma of not rehiring the employee forecloses 
other employment opportunities, then an independently protected in-
terest is at stake and the Due Process Clause applies. 235 
Dissemination of a child care worker's status on the state child 
abuse registry to employers undoubtedly precludes that employee 
from future employment in the field. When a state labels an individual 
as a child abuser, it does not reflect merely poor job performance or 
certain personal inadequacies, 236 but it declares that the individual 
presents potential danger to children and possibly has committed 
criminal acts. Courts consistently have held that information that cre-
ates such inferences of serious misconduct is sufficiently stigmatizing 
to foreclose future employment. 237 This stigmatization therefore 
would implicate an employee's protected liberty interest in 
employment. 
Although the Court has narrowed the scope of liberty and prop-
erty interests that the Due Process Clause protects, most child care 
workers whose names appear on an employer-accessible child abuse 
registry will be able to claim state deprivation of some constitutionally 
protected interest. Courts do not recognize a protected liberty interest 
interest. 424 U.S. at 701. It is not clear, however, whether the word "employment" here refers 
to foreclosure of employment or merely loss of employment, and Paul is elsewhere inconsistent 
as to the term's meaning in this respect. See supra note 211; see also Doe, 753 F.2d at 1110 n.18. 
The Second Circuit has read Paul narrowly, holding that only defamation occurring "in the 
course of dismissal from a government job or termination of some other legal right or status will 
suffice to constitute a deprivation of a liberty interest." Neu v. Corcoran, 869 F.2d 662, 667 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989); see also Easton v. Sundram, 947 F.2d 1011, 1016-17 (2d 
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1943 (1992). 
233. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). 
234. 408 U.S. at 573-74. 
235. See, e.g., Larry v. Lawler, 605 F.2d 954, 957-58 (7th Cir. 1978); Knehans v. Alexander, 
566 F.2d 312, 319-20 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Robinson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 
(1978); Huntley v. Community Sch. Bd., 543 F.2d 979, 985-86 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 
U.S. 929 (1977); Velger v. Cawley, 525 F.2d 334, 336-37 (2d Cir. 1975), revd. percuriam on other 
grounds sub nom. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977). Because Roth predated Paul, one cannot 
interpret this protected liberty interest in avoiding foreclosure of employment opportunities as 
merely an application of the "stigma-plus" test, but miist construe it as an independent right. 
236. See Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562 F.2d 701, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that allegations 
of unsatisfactory job performance and insubordination were not "of such a serious and deroga-
tory nature as to require procedural due process protection"). 
237. See Angrisani v. City of New York, 639 F. Supp. 1326, 1333 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); supra 
note 228. 
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in reputation unless the governmental stigma is accompanied by some 
other deprivation, but consequential loss of employment may satisfy 
this "plus" requirement. Similarly, courts permit workers to claim a 
property interest in their employment only if they enjoy some form of 
job security. However, when state action forecloses future employ-
ment opportunities, courts have recognized a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in employment. Because inclusion on a child 
abuse registry will effect such a foreclosure of employment for child 
care workers, the state's procedures come under Due Process Clause 
scrutiny whenever the procedures permit prospective employers access 
to the state's child abuse registry.23s 
4. State Action 
Because the Fourteenth Amendment places restrictions on states 
rather than on private parties,239 a citizen claiming the violation of a 
constitutional right must identify some form of state action causing 
the deprivation. 24-0 Where a state-owned or state-operated child care 
facility terminates or refuses to hire a child care worker because of 
that individual's appearance on an employer-accessible child abuse 
registry, the element of state action is satisfied. State action is also 
present if state law requires a private child care employer to terminate 
an employee who appears on the registry.241 However, the state need 
not act directly in order for a constitutional violation to occur. Even 
where a private employer makes the final decision to terminate an em-
ployee, the state may be involved sufficiently so that the loss of pro-
tected rights results from state action. 
The Supreme Court has held that "a State normally can be held 
responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive 
power or has provided such significant encouragement, either covert 
or overt, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the 
State."242 The decisions of the Courts of Appeals in Chernin v. 
Lyng243 and Phillips v. Vandygrif.!244 demonstrate this principle in the 
238. The Court has imposed two additional requirements for application of the Due Process 
Clause to stigmatizing government statements. First, there must be publication of the stigma-
tizing statements. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). Permitting employer access to a state's 
child abuse registry satisfies this condition. Angrisani, 639 F. Supp. at 1333. Second, the plaintiff 
must allege that the defamatory remarks arefalse. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 628 (1977) (per 
curiam). This Note assumes arguendo that the state's characterization of an individual as a child 
abuser, signified by the "indicated" designation on its child abuse registry, is inaccurate. 
239. The Due Process Clause reads in part, "No State shall .•• deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1. 
240. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. l, 13 (1947). 
241. See, e.g., Tingle v. Tennessee Dept. of Human Servs., No. 88-5035, 1988 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 16533, at *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 6, 1988) (per curiam). 
242. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). 
243. 874 F.2d 501 (8th Cir. 1989). 
244. 711 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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context of employee terminations. The plaintiff in Chemin was an em-
ployee of a meat-packing business who had several prior felony convic-
tiQns. When the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) learned of 
Chemin's criminal history, it refused to provide necessary inspection 
services for his employer's plants.245 After months of wrangling, the 
employer agreed to sever all ties with Chemin, and the USDA agreed 
to provide inspection services. 246 Although the federal government 
neither terminated Chemin itself nor forced Chemin's employer to do 
so, the court held that Chemin stated a due process claim. ~47 
In Phillips, the nexus between governmental action and the plain-
tiff's adverse employment consequences was even more tenuous. Phil-
lips was a banker who had been involved peripherally in a savings and 
loan scandal. In the Texas savings and loan industry, it was custom-
ary for employers to contact Vandygriff, the state commissioner, for 
advice on prospective employees. Even though Phillips never had 
worked at the scandal-plagued institution, Vandygriff allegedly impli-
cated Phillips in these improprieties and refused to recommend Phil-
lips to other savings and loans. As a result, Phillips claimed, he was 
unable to find work in the industry.248 Although the plaintiff did not 
allege that Vandygriff or any other state employee legally prevented or 
even coerced any employer not to hire him, the court analogized his 
situation to that of a rejected license applicant and held that the Due 
Process Clause applied. 249 
When employers terminate or refuse to hire child care workers as a 
direct result of their appearance on an employer-accessible child abuse 
registry, the state uses tactics at least as coercive as the governmental 
behavior displayed in Chemin and Phillips. First, when a state incor-
rectly alleges that a child care worker is a child abuser, it makes a 
stigmatizing and defamatory statement that devastates that individ-
ual's professional reputation. In an industry involving daily contact 
with children, such a statement is equivalent to labeling a person un-
qualified for the occupation. 250 Second, the government compels child 
care agencies to terminate employees appearing on the registry by rec-
ognizing their liability in tort for negligently hiring or retaining indi-
viduals whom the state has identified as child abusers.251 Third and 
245. Chemin, 874 F.2d at 502-03. 
246. The parties entered into a Stipulation and Consent Decision as a settlement of litigation 
brought by the employer against the USDA. 847 F.2d at 503; cf. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 
474, 475-76 (1959) (describing a situation in which an employer terminated an employee after 
the government revoked the employee's security clearance). 
247. 874 F.2d at 504. 
248. Phillips, 711 F.2d at 1219-20. 
249. 711 F.2d at 1223. 
250. Cf. Phillips, 711 F.2d at 1223 (discussing "de facto" licensing); supra text accompanying 
notes 149-56 (discussing occupational licensing). 
251. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
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most important, the state exercises control over the very existence of 
child care facilities through licensing and places substantial pressure 
on these employers to disassociate themselves from employees named 
on the child abuse registry through the threat of nonrenewal of the 
necessary licenses. Thus, even where a private child care facility vol-
untarily terminates an employee because of the worker's appearance 
on an employer-accessible child abuse registry, there generally will be 
sufficient state action involved for the affected employee to maintain a 
due process claim. 252 
B. Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge Test 
The Supreme Court's 1970 decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 253 which 
held unconstitutional the termination of welfare benefits without a 
prior hearing, "detonated . . . the procedural 'due process explo-
sion' "254 by opening all forms of administrative decisionmaking to 
such constitutional scrutiny.255 While Goldberg and its progeny 
greatly expanded the scope of procedural due process applications, 256 
the Court had developed no method of determining exactly what pro-
cess was due in a given situation. 257 One commentator described the 
results as "hazy at best, inconsistent at worst."258 
In Mathews v. Eldridge 259 the Court clarified the applicable stan-
dard by articulating a three-factor test for evaluating administrative 
procedures. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, declared: 
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires 
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will 
be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous depri-
vation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and fi-
252. The necessary state action also may arise from substantial state funding and control of 
private child care agencies. See, e.g .. Angrisani v. City of New York, 639 F. Supp. 1326, 1333-34 
(E.D.N.Y. 1986). 
253. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
254. Marc A. Bernstein, Note, Mathews v. Eldridge Reviewed: A Fair Test on Balance, 67 
GEO. L.J. 1407, 1407 (1979) (quoting Friendly, supra note 148, at 1268). 
255. These areas included such governmental activities as benefits programs, licensing, mass 
employment, education, and corrections. Rubin, supra note 109, at 1044-45. 
256. See, e.g .. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). 
257. The closest the Court had come to presenting a standard was its often repeated state· 
ment that " 'due process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed 
content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. Mc-
Grath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), quoted in Cafeteria & Restau-
rant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). Unsurprisingly, this 
provided little guidance for lower courts. 
258. Bernstein, supra note 254, at 1407; see also Mark Andrews, Aristotle and Mr. Eldridge: 
A Development of the Calculus in Mathews v. Eldridge, 20 GONZ. L. REV. 343, 343-44 (1985) 
(arguing that the Mathews test has failed to remedy the problem of vagueness). 
259. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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nally, the Government's interest .... 260 
The Court prescribed a balancing of these factors to determine "when, 
under our constitutional system, judicial-type procedures must be im-
posed upon administrative action to assure fairness."26 1 
Despite receiving a hostile reception from most legal commenta-
tors, 262 the Mathews test has become the predominant standard for 
assessing procedural requirements.263 Consequently, courts should 
apply the test to child abuse registry statutes to decide whether the 
procedural protections the registry statutes provide are adequate. 264 
1. The Private Interest Affected 
Loss of employment constitutes the most prominent private inter-
est affected by employer-accessible child abuse registries. The Court 
has regarded continued employment as a substantial interest in it-
self. 265 But governmental characterizations of child care employees as 
child abusers do not just deprive the workers of their present employ-
ment; they effectively bar the employees from the child care indus-
try. 266 The state thereby prevents child care workers from supporting 
themselves and their families, and in doing so implicates one of the 
most important private interests, the right to earn a livelihood.267 Fi-
nally, when a state brands individuals as child abusers and causes their 
260. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Commentators accurately have described the test as utilita-
rian because it functions to approve additional procedural protections only when they will benefit 
society as a whole, rather than just the affected individual. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme 
Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three 
Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L REv. 28, 46-49 (1976); Bernstein, supra 
note 254, at 1411-12. 
261. 424 U.S. at 348. The Mathews Court, however, decided the case mostly by comparison 
to Goldberg, rather than by an explicit balancing process. See 424 U.S. at 340-47. 
262. See Andrews, supra note 258, at 344-45 & n.10 (finding only two supporters of Mathews 
out of 11 authors surveyed, one of whom later recanted); Bernstein, supra note 254, at 1411 
(reporting that both the initial case notes and the subsequent law review articles were over-
whelmingly critical). For examples of such criticism, see Mashaw, supra note 260; Rubin, supra 
note 109, at 1137-45. But see Bernstein, supra note 254, at 1412-27 (calling Mathews a sound 
test). 
263. See Bernstein, supra note 254, at 1412 ("[F]ederal courts have almost invariably em-
ployed the [Mathews] balancing test when judging the adequacy of a challenged procedure."). 
264. See supra section I.A. 
265. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985) ("[T]he significance 
of the private interest in employment cannot be gainsaid."); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 
(1979) (holding that a horse trainer has a substantial interest in avoiding license suspension); see 
also Bernstein, supra note 254, at 1416 & n.91. 
266. See Valmonte v. Perales, 788 F. Supp. 745, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); supra text accompany-
ing notes 236-37. Efforts at linking state child abuse registries to create a national child abuse 
registry will only increase the depth of the deprivation. 
267. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 ("[T]ermination of [welfare benefits] pending 
resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means to 
live while he waits."); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (holding that a hearing 
must precede wage garnishment under the Due Process Clause because of the heavy financial 
burden placed on some workers). 
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subsequent termination on those grounds, it creates an often indelible 
stigma which "causes damage more enduring and extensive"268 than 
the official state sanctions. This stigma will not only damage the indi-
viduals' relationships with friends and family, and his standing in the 
community, but may cause difficulty in securing any form of 
employment. 269 
2. Risk of E"or 
As this Note illustrates in Part I, state child abuse detection sys-
tems ·appear to carry a substantial risk of error.270 The frequent inac-
curacy of child abuse reports introduces this risk,271 and the low 
standards of proof that ·child abuse statutes employ compounds it.272 
The Supreme Court has held that the standard of proof " 'serves to 
allocate the risk of error between the litigants' " 273 and "reflects the 
value society places on individual liberty."274 Specifically, the Court 
has recognized an inverse relationship between the standard of proof 
and the risk of error: the lower the standard of proof, the more the 
individual absorbs the risk of possible error, and the less individual 
268. James 0. Freedman, Summary Action by Administrative Agencies, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 
33 (1972). 
269. Cf Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1972) (holding Due Process Clause 
to be implicated when circumstances of termination preclude future employment); Doe v. United 
States Dept. of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1104-05 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Larry v. Lawler, 605 F.2d 954, 
958 (7th Cir. 1978) (following Roth). While the employment ramifications subsequently can be 
remedied, the damage to one's reputation sustained when the state publicly levies a charge of 
child abuse "is sometimes so great that, in effect, the availability of a subsequent hearing is 
meaningless." Freedman, supra note 268, at 34-35. 
270. The hypothetical case presented supra in section I.B.1 provides an illustration of the 
magnitude of this risk on an individual level. 
271,. See DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, RECOGNIZING CHILD ABUSE 12 (reporting that as many 
as 65%'of child abuse reports are unfounded); RICHARD WEXLER, WOUNDED INNOCENTS 85 
(estimating that state agencies receive over 1.3 million false reports of child abuse annually); 
Douglas J. Besharov, Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting and Investigation: Policy Guidelines for 
Decisionmaking, 22 FAM. L.Q. l, 12-13 (1988) (reporting that only 40% of child abuse reports 
are substantiated and 4% to 10% are knowingly false); David P.H. Jones & Ann Seig, Child 
Sexual Abuse Allegations in Custody or Visitation Disputes, in SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN 
CUSTODY AND VISITATION CASES 22, 26 (E. Bruce Nicholson ed., 1988) [hereinafter SEXUAL 
ABUSE ALLEGATIONS] (finding one in five allegations of child abuse arising during custody or 
visitation disputes to be fictitious); Frances Sink, Studies of True and False Allegations: A Criti-
cal Review, in SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS, supra, at 37, 40 (reporting study finding only 54% 
of Colorado sexual abuse reports to be reliable and 7% to be fictitious); Alan Abrahamson, Child 
Protective System in S.D. Scored by Grand Jury, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1992, at Al (reporting 
findings of San Diego grand jury of widespread inaccuracy in child abuse reporting and investiga-
tion system); CBS Evening News (television broadcast, Nov. 17, 1992) (discussing cases of three 
men falsely accused of child abuse). 
272. See Valmonte v. Perales, 788 F. Supp. 745, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 49-52. 
273 •. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979). 
274. Addington, 441 U.S. at 425 (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 
1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. dismissed per curiam sub nom. 
Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972)); accord Stantosky v. Kramer, 455 
U.S. 745, 755-56 (1982). 
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rights are valued. 275 
Most states have adopted a "some credible evidence" standard of 
proof for inclusion on the child abuse registry.276 Such a standard 
imposes no duty on the factfinder to weigh. conflicting evidence and 
consequently is a significant step below the "preponderance of the evi-
dence" standard typically used for civil disputes.277 The standard 
therefore creates a high risk of false positives in child abuse investiga-
tions, which translates into a high risk that the state will erroneously 
place child care workers on its child abuse registry. 213 
The nature of the evidentiary issues that state agencies adjudicate 
in child abuse cases further exacerbates the risk of error. Courts and 
commentators have recognized a distinction between "subjective" and 
"objective" issues.279 The former issues "are thought to be those bear-
ing on matters such as credibility, sincerity and fault,''280 while the 
latter depend on statistical or documentary proof.281 Courts have gen-
erally required greater procedural protections and therefore assessed 
the risk to be greater when administrative decisions have turned on 
subjective, rather than objective, criteria.282 
The Supreme Court has recognized that child neglect proceedings 
"employ imprecise substantive standards that leave determinations un-
usually open to the subjective values ofthejudge."283 The same char-
acterization applies to child abuse investigations. These inquiries 
275. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755; Addington. 441 U.S. at 423-24. 
276. See supra notes 23, 28 and accompanying text. 
277. The "preponderance of the evidence" standard has been held to "indicateO •.. society's 
'minimal concern with the outcome' " and a conclusion that the litigants should "share the risk 
of error in a roughly equal fashion." Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755 (quoting in part Addington, 441 
U.S. at 423). The logical extension of this is that the "some credible evidence" standard reflects a 
virtually nonexistent state interest in whether an individual officially is labeled a child abuser and 
a judgment that the accused should bear most of the risk of error. This stance is entirely incon-
sistent with the state's position in other quasi-criminal adjudications. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 
756 ("[T]he Court has deemed [an intermediate standard of proof] necessary to preserve funda-
mental fairness in ..• proceedings that threaten the individual involved with 'a significant depri-
vation ofliberty' or 'stigma.'" (quoting Addington. 441 U.S. at 425-26)); Addington, 441 U.S. at 
424. See also infra notes 357-65 and accompanying text. 
278. Cf. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755; Addington, 441 U.S. at 423 (describing relationship be-
tween standard of proof and risk of error). 
279. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762-63 (describing standards for ascertaining child neglect); 
Addington, 441 U.S. at 427 (discussing standards for civil commitment of the mentally ill); Ma-
thews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343-44 (1976) (contrasting criteria for determining disability 
with those for deciding welfare eligibility); Andrews, supra note 258, at 362; Bernstein, supra 
note 254, at 1419-23. 
280. Bernstein, supra note 254, at 1420-21. 
281. But see id. at 1421 (defining objective issues as "all issues that are not subjective" and 
rejecting a definition confining the term to issues well-suited to documentary proof). Bernstein 
further asserts that the lack of definition of these terms leads to difficulty in applying them to 
actual cases. 
282. Andrews, supra note 258, at 362; Bernstein, supra note 254, at 1420-21; see also 
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762-63 & n.12; Addington, 441 U.S. at 427; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343-44. 
283. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762. 
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often involve inherently subjective evidence because the incidents of 
alleged abuse occur in private settings with no disinterested wit-
nesses. 284 Physical evidence of abuse, if present, may be ambiguous in 
nature.285 Many cases will boil down to a simple credibility determi-
nation by the investigator who "possesses unusual discretion to un-
derweigh probative facts that might favor the parent. "286 Such 
reliance on circumstantial evidence and sheer subjective opinion un-
doubtedly undermines the accuracy of the initial determination.287 
Finally, states' frequent failure to provide a formal opportunity for 
the accused to contest the states' findings until after the agency has 
made its initial decision also heightens the risk of error in the child 
abuse system.288 While an individual may attempt to tell his side of 
the story in the course of an investigator's interrogation, the state 
grants no hearing on the matter until after his name appears on the 
state child abuse registry.289 This absence of predeprivation proce-
dural protections naturally increases the possibility that the state will 
rely upon inaccurate or incomplete information, which in turn in-
creases the chance for error.290 
A variety of factors contribute to an especially high risk of error in 
state child abuse investigations. Cases are initiated by a reporting sys-
tem that includes a substantial percentage of inaccurate allegations. 
The "some credible evidence" standard of proof that most states em-
ploy essentially screens out only accusations that entirely lack founda-
tion. Evidence used to substantiate child abuse charges is frequently 
of a highly subjective nature, with the result that the outcome of the 
284. See, e.g., Angrisani v. New York, 639 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); see also supra 
text accompanying notes 40-41. 
285. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 40. A classic parental explanation for such 
evidence is that the child's injuries were sustained during play, in a fall, or in some similar 
manner. See IVERSON & SEGAL, supra note 2, at 78 ("A common reason for physical abuse to go 
unreported or untreated is that parents provide accounts that the injuries are accidental in na· 
ture, and these accounts are accepted at face value."). 
286. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762. The Court also expressed a concern that these judgments 
would reflect cultural or class biases. 455 U.S. at 763. This determination will not necessarily 
involve weighing the word of the child against that of the parent; both the alleged victim and the 
accused many deny that abuse has occurred, forcing investigators to assess credibility in an abso-
lute sense. See WEXLER, supra note 271, at 10-14, 96-97, 148-49, 299 (describing actual cases in 
which this scenario has arisen). 
287. Such evidence includes physical injuries to the child, observations of teachers, doctors, 
and relatives, or second-hand reports. 
288. See Angrisani v. City of New York, 639 F. Supp. 1326, 1335 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); cf. 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits); Sniadach v. Family 
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (wage garnishment). 
289. See Angrisani, 639 F. Supp. at 1335; see supra text accompanying notes 25-26. In gen-
eral, a person placed on the child abuse registry may submit a request for expungement, but only 
after the state agency has completed its investigation. If the state denies this request, the accused 
can demand a hearing, but in the interim his name remains on the registry. 
290. See Freedman, supra note 268, at 27 ("When an administrative agency acts on incom-
plete information, untested by the adversary process and untempered by an opportunity for de-
liberation, it is far more likely to err."). 
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investigation often hinges on the discretion of the investigators. Most 
states' failure to provide accused individuals any formal opportunity 
to defend themselves until the investigation is concluded further en-
hances the high rate of inaccuracy. The combination of these factors 
creates a significant risk that states falsely will label some citizens as 
child abusers. 
3. The Government's Interest 
The state has at least two interests in maintaining its current pro-
cedures for access to child abuse registries. First and most important, 
the state has a parens patriae interest in preserving the welfare of chil-
dren by limiting children's exposure to potentially harmful adults.29 1 
A lack of procedural safeguards facilitates this goal by allowing the 
state quickly to isolate a child care employee from contact with chil-
dren upon the first indication of abusive tendencies. 292 Imposing pro-
cedural protections, such as a predeprivation hearing or an enhanced 
standard of proof, necessarily will impede this goal either by delaying 
governmental action or by permitting more false negative findings. On 
the other hand, these procedures do serve a subsidiary state interest in 
reducing the number of false positive findings of child abuse.293 
The state also has a clear interest in preventing an increase in its 
administrative costs. 294 Courts often have been reluctant to place 
heavy fiscal burdens on state agencies by mandating onerous proce-
dures, and they have weighed the financial costs of such measures 
against their potential benefits.295 Tiie costs to the state of providing 
additional procedural protections to accused child abusers before dis-
closing information to their employers may be substantial, as such 
safeguards usually entail increased paperwork and require a greater 
resource commitment from agencies often already understaffed and 
underfunded.296 One ameliorating consideration is that the number of 
291. Cf. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766 (noting state's parens patriae interest in preserving and 
promoting the welfare of the child in parental rights termination proceedings). 
292. Such a policy choice typifies governmental summary action in that it subordinates "the 
fundamental values that deliberative hearings are believed to serve: reducing the possibility of 
error and protecting the individual against precipitate use of governmental authority ••. to others 
deemed more important." Freedman, supra note 268, at 27. 
293. Cf. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767-68 (holding that state has interest in accurately determin-
ing whether parents are capable of caring for their children and that stricter standard of proof 
furthers that interest); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (finding state interest in not 
confining individuals not mentally ill furthered by stricter standard of proot). 
294. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766. 
295. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347-48 (1976) ("At some point the benefit 
of an additional safeguard to the individual ... may be outweighed by the cost."). Critics of the 
Mathews test have particularly disparaged the view implicit in this language that the values rep-
resented by the Due Process Clause effectively can be placed in monetary terms. See Rubin, 
supra note 109, at 1143; see also Mashaw, supra note 260, at 48. 
296. But cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 544 (1985) (holding that 
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child care workers accused of child abuse likely will remain small.297 
Nevertheless, the state's interests in avoiding additional administrative 
costs may be an important factor, depending upon the particular 
procedure. 
4. Balancing the Factors 
Although Mathews gives no clear indication of how to translate the 
three factors into a constitutional prescription,298 the Court's ap-
proach in Santosky v. Kramer299 provides guidance. Santosky arose 
out of New York State's termination of the plaintiffs' parental rights 
on the grounds of permanent neglect.300 The Santoskys challenged the 
constitutionality of the authorizing statute3°1 and alleged that the 
"preponderance of the evidence" standard that it employed failed to 
protect their interests adequately under the Due Process Clause.302 
After finding that the state action implicated the plaintiffs' fundamen-
tal liberty interest in "the care, custody and management of their 
child,"303 the Court applied the Mathews test. It found a "command-
ing" private interest,304 a "substantial" risk of error,305 and only a 
"slight" governmental interest. 306 The Court concluded that use of 
the "preponderance of the evidence" standard in parental termination 
proceedings offended the Due Process Clause, reasoning that "'[t]he 
individual should not be asked to share equally with society the risk of 
providing hearing to discharged employees "would impose neither a significant administrative 
burden nor intolerable delays" on the state). 
297. See Elaine S. Pavich, Day Care, Abuse: New Statistics, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 22, 1988, § 1, 
at 3 (discussing study showing that child abuse at day care centers is rare and that 80% of such 
cases involve a single abuser); Joyce Purnick, Convictions of 3.8% Found in Updated Day-Care 
Check, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1985, at B3 (finding that the New York state child abuse registry 
listed fewer than one percent of New York City child care workers). 
298. See Rubin, supra note 109, at 1138 (''The Court's frequent answer is to 'balance' or 
'weigh' the various factors. This reliance upon 'weight,' which is a useful approach for dealing 
with bananas. leaves something to be desired where factors such as those in Mathews are 
concerned."). 
299. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
300. 455 U.S. at 752. A family court ordered the actual termination, but the Department of 
Social Services, which is also responsible for maintaining the child abuse registry and investigat-
ing child abuse, made the findings of neglect. 
301. N.Y. FAM. Cr. Acr § 622 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1992). 
302. 455 U.S. at 751. 
303. 455 U.S. at 753-54 & n.7. 
304. 455 U.S. at 758. The Court considered the parents' interest in custody over their chil-
dren to be a vital interest which irreparably and immeasurably would be harmed by erroneous 
termination. 455 U.S. at 758-61 & n.11. 
305. 455 U.S. at 758. 
306. 455 U.S. at 758. The Court identified the same two government interests as employer 
access to child abuse registries involves - protecting the welfare of children and minimizing 
administrative costs. 455 U.S. at 766. It reasoned that the use of a more stringent standard of 
proof would impose little additional fiscal burden on the state, and that since the state's interest 
in child welfare encompassed an interest in not separating children erroneously from their fami-
lies, the heightened standard actually would serve this state purpose. 455 U.S. at 766-67. 
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error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater 
than any possible harm to the state.' "307 · 
Santosky's approach to balancing the factors of the Mathews test 
can be visualized by placing the first and third elements of the Ma-
thews test - the private interest and the government's interest - on 
either end of a beam. The middle factor, the risk of error, represents 
the fulcrum of the beam. As the risk of error increases, the fulcrum 
shifts toward the government's side of the beam; as it diminishes, the 
fulcrum shifts toward the private interests. Consequently, the greater 
the risk of error, the more the government's interest must outweigh 
that of the individual in order for the balance to tilt in favor of the 
constitutionality of its actions. 30s 
Applying this principle to child abuse registry statutes permitting 
employer access reveals their unconstitutionality as presently imple-
mented. The registry statutes do not affect the fundamental family-
related liberties identified in Santosky, 309 but they do affect important 
individual interests in employment and reputation.310 The govern-
ment has a stronger interest in restraining administrative costs than it 
did in Santosky, because the full panoply of procedural safeguards will 
be more costly than merely enhancing the standard of proof, and the 
state has less interest in preventing erroneous deprivation of employ-
ment than in preventing erroneous dissolution of families.311 As in 
Santosky, the state has an interest in protecting children from harm.312 
The "some credible evidence" standard of proof that child abuse 
registry statutes employ combined with their meager procedural safe-
guards create a very high risk of error.313 This shifts the fulcrum 
sharply toward the government's side of the beam. Thus, if the gov-
ernmental and private interests equaled each other,314 the balance 
would tilt strongly toward the individual and hence toward the con-
clusion that these statutes violate the Due Process Clause. Even if the 
relative interests of the state and the individual tilt slightly in favor of 
307. 455 U.S. at 768 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979)). The statute in 
question required the state to prove by a "fair preponderance of the evidence" that a child per-
manently had been neglected. 
308. In Santosky, for instance, the "preponderance of the evidence" standard equalized the 
risk between the parties and therefore placed the fulcrum at the midpoint of the beam. But 
because the private interests vastly outweighed the governmental interests, the beam tilted to-
ward the individual and the statute was unconstitutional. See 455 U.S. at 758; see also Adding-
ton, 441 U.S. at 427. 
309. See supra note 304; cf. Glasford v. New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 787 F. Supp. 
384, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
310. See supra notes 265-69 and accompanying text. 
311. See supra notes 291-97 and accompanying text. 
312. See supra notes 291-93 and accompanying text. 
313. See supra notes 270-90 and accompanying text. 
314. Such a proposition is itself dubious considering the weight given similar interests in 
Santosky. See supra note 304. 
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the former, they do not balance so disproportionately as to validate the 
constitutionality of employer-accessible child abuse registries under 
the procedural schemes that exist today.31s 
IV. CREATING A CONSTITUTIONAL EMPLOYER-ACCESSIBLE 
CHILD A.BUSE REGISTRY STATUTE 
Risk of error is the only variable in the foregoing analysis over 
which the state has any control. Thus, in order for states to create 
constitutional employer-accessible child abuse registries, they must re-
duce the risk of error in their child abuse investigations. States can 
accomplish this by adding and enhancing procedural protections for 
the accused. This Part argues that, by applying common procedural 
safeguards, states can create employer-accessible child abuse registries 
that comply with the requirements of the Due Process Clause. 
No formula exists for ascertaining the precise level and type of pro-
cedural safeguards the Due Process Clause demands in any given case. 
" '[D]ue process' ... is not a technical conception with a fixed content 
unrelated to time, place and circumstances .... [It] is not a mechani-
cal instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a process."316 Courts and 
commentators have recognized that the constitutional adequacy of a 
scheme depends upon the total procedural picture, so the enhance-
ment of one safeguard may justify the weakening of another.317 The 
government may protect an individual's due process rights through a 
variety of procedural schemes affording equivalent protection. 
The Court has enumerated six safeguards basic to such a scheme: 
(1) written notice of the claimed offenses; (2) disclosure of evidence 
against the accused; (3) opportunity to be heard in person and to pres-
ent witnesses and documentary evidence; ( 4) the right to confront and 
cross-examine adverse witnesses; (5) a neutral and detached arbiter; 
and (6) a written statement by the factfinder detailing the reasons for 
the decision and the evidence relied upon in making that choice.318 
This list omits only one possibly important element of procedural due 
process, the right to counsel.319 This Part evaluates the necessity of 
each of these seven elements in assembling a constitutional, employer-
accessible child abuse registry system. 
315. See supra Part I. 
316. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring); see also Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
317. See Friendly, supra note 148, at 1279. 
318. Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972); cf Friendly, supra note 148, at 1279-95 
(listing 11 such elements). 
319. See Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 559 (1974); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 
(1970); Friendly, supra note 148, at 1287-91. 
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A. Notice 
The Court has viewed notice as" '[a]n elementary and fundamen-
tal requirement of due process in any proceeding . . . . ' " 320 Indeed, 
notice is necessary for the accused to begin mounting a defense321 and 
to avoid deprivations that the accused could forestall. 322 The notice 
requirement has two components: timeliness and informativeness. 
Due process requires the state to maximize both, especially when do-
ing so imposes few additional burdens.323 Accordingly, the Court has 
mandated that notice be " 'reasonably calculated, under all the cir-
cumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action 
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.' "324 
Because most child abuse investigations involve, at the very least, 
interviewing the alleged perpetrator, this contact alone will provide 
some notice, but not the sort that the Due Process Clause demands. 325 
Instead, the state should provide the accused written notice when it 
lodges a child abuse report.326 Full disclosure of the state's informa-
tion may conflict with a desire to protect the identity of the accuser, 327 
but it easily can supply the accused with the date, time, and location of 
the alleged incident, and the name of the victim. 328 While this small 
act will involve inconsequential administrative burdens, it will permit 
the accused child abuser to understand quickly and conclusively the 
nature and gravity of the charges against him. 
B. Disclosure of Evidence 
Many judges have leveled diatribes against the government's use of 
secret informers, 329 but its use of secret evidence is even more perni-
320. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover 
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 
U.S. 532, 542 (1985); Morrisey, 408 U.S. at 486·87; Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270. 
321. See Friendly, supra note 148, at 1280-81. 
322. See, e.g., Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 551 (opportunity to contest adoption lost due to failure 
to notify petitioner). 
323. See Friendly, supra note 148, at 1280 ("It is likewise fundamental that notice be given 
and that it be timely and clearly inform the individual of the proposed action and the grounds for 
it."). 
324. Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 550 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314); see also Wolff. 418 U.S. 
at 564. 
325. The Due Process Clause requires notice sufficient to inform the accused fully as to the 
nature of the charges. See Busche v. Burkee, 649 F.2d 509 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 
(1981). 
326. Courts often have required that notice be in written form. See, e.g., Morrisey v. Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972); Glenn v. Newman, 614 F.2d 467, 472 (5th Cir. 1980). 
327. Since rights of confrontation and cross-examination implicate this concern to an even 
greater degree, this Note addresses it at length infra at notes 374-79 and accompanying text. 
328. In the case of an anonymous report of child abuse, the issue of confidentiality would be 
moot. 
329. See, e.g., Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 350-52 (1955) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also 
infra notes 367-68 and accompanying text. 
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cious. This practice often precludes accused individuals from defend-
ing themselves on the merits of the charge. Accused persons may 
deny wrongdoing generally, proclaim themselves virtuous and exem-
plary citizens, and submit countless affidavits from prominent individ-
uals proclaiming their good character, but they cannot address any of 
the facts which ultimately will form the basis of the government's de-
termination. 330 Given this tremendous potential for governmental 
abuse, it is unsurprising that "no fair dispute [exists] over the right to 
know the nature of the evidence on which the administrator relies."331 
The rationale for compelling full disclosure of evidence applies 
particularly strongly to child abuse determinations. Child abuse is a 
fact-specific offense revolving around a particular incident or series of 
incidents. It often occurs in a context with no disinterested witnesses, 
and the allegations consequently often rest on the words of children, 
who may be unreliable as witnesses. 332 Moreover, the available evi-
dence is frequently subject to widely varying interpretation.333 For 
these reasons, it is essential that the state enable alleged child abusers 
to provide their versions of the incident or incidents that form the 
basis of the charge. 
The administrative costs of evidentiary disclosure are not signifi-
cant because the state must only copy the documents in its possession 
or otherwise permit access to its evidence. The state may have an in-
330. Cf. Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 100-01 (1963); Greene 
v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 478-80 (1959); Peters, 349 U.S. at 335-36 (describing parties' efforts to 
defend themselves against charges based on undisclosed evidence). 
331. Friendly, supra note 148, at 1283. 
332. See RALPH c. UNDERWAGER & HOLLIDA WAKEFIELD, THE REAL WORLD OF CHILD 
INTERROGATIONS 27-28 (1990); Stephen J. Ceci et. al, Age Differences in Suggestibility: Narrow-
ing the Uncertainties, in CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS MEMORY 79 (Stephen J. Ceci et al. eds., 
1987) (concluding that young 'children are more suggestible than older children or adults); Ron-
ald A. Cohen & Mary A. Harnick, The Susceptibility of Child Witnesses to Suggestion, 4 LA w & 
HUM. BEHAV. 201, 208-09 (1980) (finding young children to be less reliable eyewitnesses than 
adults); Jeffrey J. Haugaard et al., Childrens' Definitions of the Truth and Their Competency as 
Witnesses in Legal Proceedings, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 253, 267-69 (1991) (finding children's 
memories less accurate than adult memories); Mary A. King & John C. Yuille, Suggestibility and 
the Child Witness, in CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS MEMORY, supra, at 24, 28-30 (discussing chil-
dren's suggestibility under direct questioning); Arie Press et al., The Youngest Witnesses, NEWS· 
WEEK, Feb. 18, 1985, at 72. But see Mary Avery, The Child Abuse Witness: Potential for 
Secondary Victimization, 7 CRIM. Jusr. J. 1, 10-13 (1983) (asserting that children rarely lie about 
abuse); Christopher B. Reid, Note, The Sexual Innocence Inference Theory as the Basis for the 
Admissibility ofa Child Molestation Victim's Prior Sexual Conduct, 91 MICH. L. REv. 827, 857 & 
n.156 (1993) (citing sources attesting to accuracy of children's accusations of abuse). Accusa-
tions of child abuse also frequently arise during acrimonious custody battles between parents, 
which further demeans the credibility of the witnesses. See WEXLER, supra note 271, at 141; 
Jones & Seig, supra note 271. 
333. For instance, physical injuries such as bruises may be acquired in a number of ways, 
some of which are unrelated to abuse. It may be similarly difficult for investigators to determine 
whether certain forms of physical contact are intended as sexual interactions. See BESHAROV, 
supra note 271, at 69-70, 88; WEXLER, supra note 271, at 12, 96, 139. But cf. BESHAROV, supra 
note 271, at 69-82; IVERSON & SEGAL, supra note 2, at 73-78 (demonstrating that certain types of 
physical injury almost always indicate abuse). 
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terest, though, in protecting the confidentiality of witnesses who fear 
legal or extralegal retaliation from the accused. Concealing witness' 
identities may interfere with the accused's efforts to achieve exonera-
tion; nevertheless, when witnesses have reasonable fears of retaliation 
or have cooperated with the investigation on the condition of anonym-
ity, they deserve some degree of protection. In these circumstances, 
the state may balance these competing concerns by redacting the 
names of the accusers but disclosing the substance of their testimony. 
In the absence of witness protection concerns, the state should seek 
to disclose fully to the accused its evidence of child abuse. To accom-
plish this, the state should release a written statement of its :findings to 
the accused at the conclusion of its investigation and permit the sub-
ject to examine all tangible evidence. 334 This informational exchange 
should occur well in advance of any hearing to give the accused a 
reasonable opportunity to prepare his case. 33s 
C. Hearing 
When the government deprives citizens of important interests, it 
must provide "some kind of hearing."336 The private interests impli-
cated by employer-accessible child abuse registries rise to a sufficient 
magnitude to warrant such a review.337 However, this does not an-
swer what type of hearing due process requires. Like many in the due 
process arena, the question must be decided on an ad hoc basis, by 
considering "the precise nature of the governmental function involved 
as well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental 
action. " 338 A few important characteristics merit consideration in 
light of the purposes behind the hearing requirement. 
1. Timing 
The first major aspect of the hearing issue concerns whether the 
334. In other contexts, specifically national security, one co=entator has suggested making 
special acco=odations when the state's evidence is of such a sensitive nature that divulging it 
would jeopardize fundamental state interests. See Davis, supra note 94, at 278-80. No analogous 
state interests can be discerned in the context of child abuse. 
335. See Doe v. United States Dept. of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
336. Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974); see also Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 
471, 485-87 (1972); Friendly, supra note 148, at 1267; cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-
64 (1970) (requiring evidentiary hearing before termination of welfare benefits). 
337. See supra text accompanying notes 265-69. Although the Court never explicitly has 
stated as much, "[g]ood sense would suggest that there must be some floor below which no 
hearing of any sort is required." Friendly, supra note 148, at 1275. While the level of this floor is 
difficult to fix, it most assuredly is beneath the potential loss to employment and reputation the 
state effects by labeling a person as a child abuser. 
338. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers, Local 476 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); cf. 
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 560 ("[O]ne cannot automatically apply procedural rules designed for free 
citizens in an open society ••• to the very different situation presented by a disciplinary proceed-
ing in a state prison."). 
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hearing should occur before or after the deprivation. In the context of 
employer-accessible child abuse registries, the question is whether the 
state must hold a hearing prior to entering a child care worker's name 
on the registry. The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process 
Clause sometimes requires the state to afford a hearing before in-
flicting deprivations of protected interests. 339 The Court applied this 
principle to the employment context in Cleveland Board of Education 
v. Loudermill340 and held that the Due Process Clause requires a hear-
ing before the state may terminate civil service employees possessing 
protected property interests in their employment.341 The Loudermill 
Court reasoned that employment terminations frequently involve fac-
tual disputes that only a hearing effectively can resolve.342 Moreover, 
"[e]ven where the facts are clear, the appropriateness or necessity of 
the discharge may not be."343 "[l]n such cases," the Court stated, "the 
only meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of the deci-
sionmaker is likely to be before the termination takes effect. "344 
Predeprivation hearings may enhance accuracy in other ways as 
well. In the context of an administrative adjudication, the immediate 
presence of a hearing compels investigators to proceed more cau-
tiously and thoroughly because they realize that they will have to jus-
tify publicly their methods and conclusions before taking action.345 
This restraint may be especially necessary in light of the proclivities of 
administrative staff for taking decisive action that disregards the inter-
ests of those it investigates. 346 
All of these justifications for imposing a predeprivation hearing 
before discharging a government employee apply to child abuse deter-
minations as well. Investigating allegations of child abuse frequently 
requires resolution of factual conflicts.347 Even if the state verifies a 
339. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 299 (1981); 
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263-64. 
340. 470 U.S. 532 (1985). 
341. 470 U.S. at 542; cf. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 66 (1979) (requiring prompt hearing 
subsequent to temporary license suspension). 
342. 470 U.S. at 543. 
343. 470 U.S. at 543; see also Angrisani v. City of New York, 639 F. Supp. 1326, 1335 
(E.D.N.Y. 1986). 
344. 470 U.S. at 543. The Court added that "[t]he governmental interest in immediate termi-
nation does not outweigh these interests ..•. [A]ffording the employee an opportunity to respond 
prior to termination would impose neither a significant administrative burden nor intolerable 
delays." 470 U.S. at 544. 
345. See Freedman, supra note 268, at 28 ("[T]he risk of arbitrary action is almost surely 
increased when an administrative agency is permitted to act without the moderating constraint 
that the prospect of a prior hearing typically imposes •..• "). 
346. See id. at 31. For evidence of this problem in child abuse investigations, see WBXLBR, 
supra note 271, at 96-134 (discussing investigative techniques and investigator attitudes that bias 
the process in favor of finding abuse); Abrahamson, supra note 271, at Al (reporting grand jury 
findings of antiparent bias of child abuse investigators). 
347. See supra text accompanying note 332. 
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report of abuse, it must choose from a range of possible responses. It 
can make these determinations most accurately by granting the ac-
cused an opportunity to be heard. Moreover, placement of a child 
care worker's name on an employer-accessible child abuse registry in-
flicts a particularly severe deprivation because the listing effectively 
forecloses employment in the child care profession.348 Finally, 
predeprivation hearings are not inherently more costly than 
postdeprivation proceedings. It therefore follows that the Due Process 
Clause requires the state to hold a hearing before placing a child care 
worker's name on an employer-accessible child abuse registry. 
2. Type of Hearing 
When the Court mandates a hearing, it usually means a trial-type 
hearing. Professor Davis has defined this proceeding as "a process by 
which parties present evidence, subject to cross-examination and re-
buttal, and the tribunal makes a determination on the record. "349 A 
trial-type hearing often encompasses a right to present evidence and 
call witnesses on one's behalf. 350 
The state can vindicate the opportunity to be heard in less costly 
ways such as written submissions or a single oral presentation by the 
accused. 351 However, these forms of hearing do not satisfy due pro-
cess in all circumstances. 352 They disadvantage those without well-
developed verbal or oral skills and can preclude a fair hearing if the 
individual's deficiencies are severe. 353 In addition, these methods are 
not conducive to credibility assessments354 or ascertaining the veracity 
of facts that specifically pertain to the activities of the subject. 355 In 
these situations, the give and take of a trial-type hearing will be more 
illuminating to the factfinder and more likely will lead to correction or 
prevention of erroneous administrative judgments. 
In child abuse determinations, the benefits of a trial-type hearing in 
348. See supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
349. Davis, supra note 94, at 194. 
350. Id. 
351. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545 (1985) ("'Something less' 
than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action."); Davis, supra 
note 94, at 194, 218-22 (referring to oral presentation as an argument-type hearing); Friendly, 
supra note 148, at 1281 (endorsing the use of written submissions). 
352. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970) (holding use of written submis-
sions insufficient to provide due process to terminated welfare recipients). 
353. See Goldberg. 397 U.S. at 269; Friendly, supra note 148, at 1281; cf. Wolffv. McDon-
nell, 418 U.S. 539, 570 (1974) (discussing the capacity of illiterate inmates to avail themselves of 
the prison disciplinary hearing process in the absence of counsel). 
354. See Goldberg. 391 U.S. at 269. 
355. In Professor Davis' terminology, a trial-type hearing is not necessary for deciding legis-
lative facts, which are "issues oflaw or policy or discretion," but "[f]acts pertaining to the parties 
and their activities, that is, adjudicative facts ••. ought not to be determined ••• without provid-
ing the parties an opportunity for trial." Davis, supra note 94, at 194, 199 (emphasis added). 
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ensuring procedural fairness justify its costs. First, the trial-type hear-
ing permits the parties to respond directly to each other's specific alle-
gations and provides a basis for the factfinder to resolve the factual 
conflicts that child abuse accusations often involve. Second, judg-
ments in child abuse determinations often turn on subjective assess-
ments of credibility, which no tribunal can accomplish without 
personal interaction with the witnesses and the accused.356 Finally, 
forums which rely exclusively upon written or argumentative commu-
nication may place child care workers at a disadvantage relative to 
state investigators, who are accustomed to submitting written reports 
of their findings. For these reasons, the state should grant child care 
workers a trial-type hearing before entering their names on the child 
abuse registry. 
3. Standard of Proof 
An important aspect of any hearing involves the sufficiency of 
proof required for the party who bears the burden of proof. The Court 
has recognized that the standard of proof allocates the risk of error in 
a proceeding and that the individual absorbs greater risk with a lower 
standard.357 It has also noted that "[s]ince the litigants and the 
factfinder must know at the outset of a given proceeding how the risk 
of error will be allocated, the standard of proof necessarily must be 
calibrated in advance."358 There is no formula for performing this cal-
ibration, but the Court's decisions in Addington v. Texas 359 and 
Santosky v. Kramer 360 suggest that the more important the individual 
interest, the more stringent the standard of proof the Due Process 
Clause requires. In Addington, the Court held that the Due Process 
Clause requires a "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence" stan-
dard in civil commitment proceedings.361 Similarly, the Santosky 
court required New York State to prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence that children permanently had been neglected before terminat-
ing parental rights. 362 
These decisions illuminate by comparison the woeful inadequacy 
of the "some credible evidence" standard in child abuse proceedings. 
Despite the high rates of error in child abuse reporting,363 this stan-
dard often does little more than pose a redundant question because the 
356. See supra notes 283-87 and accompanying text. 
357. See supra notes 273-75 and accompanying text. 
358. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 757 (1982). 
359. 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979). 
360. 455 U.S. 745, 754-56 (1982). 
361. Addington, 441 U.S. at 433. The Court did reject the claim that a "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard was required by the Constitution for this purpose. 441 U.S. at 432. 
362. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747. 
363. See supra note 271. 
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initial report probably would not have been made without some credi-
ble evidence of abuse. The standard provides a safeguard only against 
bad faith or entirely unfounded reports of child abuse. It does not 
substantially safeguard against accusations that are reasonable but er-
roneous, because the same evidence that motivated the report will pro-
vide the basis for confirming it. 364 In short, the "some credible 
evidence" standard effectively cannot screen child abuse allegations. 365 
Given that Santosky imposed a clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard on child neglect proceedings, the Due Process Clause demands at 
least proof of child abuse by a preponderance of the evidence before a 
state can place a child care worker on its employer-accessible child 
abuse registry. 
D. Confrontation and Cross-Examination 
The ability to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses is 
often the most valuable procedural safeguard available to the accused. 
Justice Douglas best expressed the dangers of relying on the accounts 
of informers: 
So far as we or the [factfinders] know, they may be psychopaths or venal 
people ..• who revel in being informers. They may bear old grudges .... 
Their whispered confidences might turn out to be yarns conceived by 
twisted minds or by people who, though sincere, have poor faculties of 
observation or memory.366 
Providing the accused an opportunity to confront and cross-examine 
the informant solves the problem of bad faith or erroneous testimony 
most effectively.367 Even if the allegations do not "disappear like bub-
bles,"368 the examination of informants at least will provide the 
factfinder with some grounds for judging their credibility. 
364. Much of this evidence will be of questionable probative value, such as minor physical 
injuries or a child's accusation. See supra notes 332-33 and accompanying text. 
365. In fact, this standard permits states to place individuals on the registry as indicated 
child abusers even when nobody actually believes that child abuse has occurred, including the 
accuser - who legally may be obligated to report all suspicions of child abuse - the investiga-
tor, or the alleged victim. The hypothetical given in section I.B.l presents a good example of 
such a situation. A standard form letter of the Massachusetts Department of Social Services also 
reflects this reality. The letter informs the accused child abuser that the Department has listed 
his case in the central registry as "substantiated" because "[a]t least one person said you were 
responsible for the incident and there was no available information to definitively indicate other-
wise." WEXLER, supra note 271, at 15. 
366. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 351 (1955) (Douglas, J., concurring). For an anecdotal 
illustration of this problem, see Davis, supra note 94, at 213-14 (account of John Jones); see also 
Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 
474, 478-80 (1959). 
367. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1970); Peters, 349 U.S. at 351 (Douglas, J., 
concurring) ("Confrontation and cross-examination under oath are essential, if the American 
ideal of due process is to remain a vital force in our public life."); Davis, supra note 94, at 212-13. 
But see Friendly, supra note 148, at 1284-87 (questioning the value of confrontation and cross-
examination in relation to its costs). 
368. Peters, 349 U.S. at 351 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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Confrontation and cross-examination are particularly necessary in 
child abuse cases, which frequently depend on reports of anonymous 
third-party informants. The context in which such allegations some-
times arise,369 the frequent ambiguity of the evidence,370 and the prev-
alence of mandatory reporting statutes, 371 all make reliance on an 
accuser's testimony imprudent. Unfortunately, in child abuse cases 
the right to confront and cross-examine one's accuser may conflict 
with preserving informants' anonymity. If the public perceives that 
child abuse informants may face legal or extralegal retaliation from 
the accused, this perception may deter reporting substantially.372 Per-
mitting confrontation and cross-examination also poses problems 
when the witness is a child, especially when the child witness is the 
alleged victim, for intimidation alone may substantially alter these wit-
ness' testimony.373 
In administrative hearings, confrontation and cross-examination 
rights are not absolute and may yield when they conflict with impor-
tant state interests. In the prison context, for instance, where identifi-
cation of inmate informants creates significant risks of physical harm 
for the accusers, courts have limited confrontation and cross-examina-
tion rights accordingly.374 Courts have applied this principle to em-
ployment-related hearings, as well.375 Most importantly, the Supreme 
Court has held that states may curtail defendants' rights to confront 
and cross-examine child witnesses in criminal child abuse 
prosecutions. 376 
These holdings compel the conclusion that states likewise may re-
369. See supra note 332. 
370. See supra notes 332-33 and accompanying text. 
371. See supra note 365 and accompanying text. 
372. Rape shield laws and media policies against revealing the identities of rape victims serve 
similar purposes in the context of adult sexual assault. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-407 
(1986 & 1992 Supp.); 725 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/115-7 (1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.015 (1986); 
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 60.42 (McKinney 1992). 
373. See BILLIE W. DZIECH & CHARLES B. SCHUDSON, ON TRIAL 150, 170 (1989); Avery, 
supra note 332, at 13-14 ("Recanting •.. commonly occurs in sexual abuse cases in which child 
witnesses are compelled to participate in the judicial process."); Paula E. Hill & Samuel M. Hill, 
Note, Videotaping Childrens' Testimony: An Empirical View, BS MICH. L. REV. 809, 816-17 
(1987) (study finding children's testimony less complete in courtroom setting than in more inti-
mate setting). 
374. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 568-69 (1974); see also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 
425 U.S. 308, 321-23 (1976); Baker v. Lyles, 904 F.2d 925, 929-30 (4th Cir. 1990); Freeman v. 
Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 953-54 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 485 U.S. 982 (1988); cf. Friendly, 
supra note 148, at 1286 (arguing that in many contexts, cross-examination should be allowed 
only when its value outweighs the potential incremental harm to the witness). 
375. See Boston v. Webb, 783 F.2d 1163, 1167 (4th Cir. 1986) (limiting rights of confronta· 
tion and cross-examination in termination hearing of municipal employee); Beauchamp v. De 
Abadia, 779 F.2d 773, 775-76 (1st Cir. 1985) (applying limitation to hearing on revocation of 
medical license). 
376. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990); see also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1022-25 
(1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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strict the confrontation and cross-examination rights of accused child 
abusers in order to protect child witnesses and anonymous accusers. 
When this is necessary, the state should apply alternative methods of 
witness examination. Possibilities include videotaping children's testi-
mony, 377 placing a screen between the accuser and the accused,378 ex-
amination through closed circuit television, 379 and in camera 
examination by the factfinder. 
E. Neutral and Detached Arbiter 
The Due Process Clause does not bar administrative factfinders 
who are associated with the agency that made the original determina-
tion, as long as they personally did not make the decision.380 Never-
theless, the state should provide an arbiter from outside the 
administrative agency whose decision is under review. As Judge 
Friendly has put it, "while all judges must be unbiased, some may be, 
or appear to be, more unbiased than others."381 Commentators have 
noted that members of an administrative agency tend to identify with 
the mission of the agency to the detriment of those who are regu-
lated, 382 and a member of that agency may find it difficult to abandon 
these sentiments when passing judgment on an agency action. Aside 
from this, the susceptibility of outsiders to personal bias or agency 
coercion would be markedly lower. 383 Retaining an administrative 
law judge for the small number of child abuse cases that involve child 
care employees would not place great financial burdens on the state 
and would be worth the cost. 
F. Written Statement of Reasons for the Decision 
Providing the accused with a written statement of reasons for the 
arbiter's decision promotes fairness in many ways. By restricting the 
377. See CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-6-401.3 (1986); Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.699 (Supp. 19~2); 
DZIECH & SCHUDSON, supra note 373, at 151-53; Avery, supra note 332, at 40-41; David Libai, 
The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice System, IS WAYNE 
L. REv. 977, 1028-32 (1969); Hill & Hill, supra note 373. 
378. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). While the Court in Coy held this method to 
violate the Confrontation Clause when employed in the criminal context, this does not necessar-
ily preclude its use in an administrative hearing, where the Sixth Amendment does not apply. 
Moreover, the continued vitality of the ruling is questionable in light of the Court's subsequent 
decision in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), which gave states more latitude to respond 
to the difficulties caused by child witnesses. 
379. See DZIECH & ScHUDSON, supra note 373, at 153-56; Avery, supra note 332, at 37-40. 
This solution applies to child witnesses only, because it does not conceal the witness' identity. 
380. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1974); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 
486 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). 
381. Friendly, supra note 148, at 1279. 
382. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 268, at 31. 
383. See Friendly, supra note 148, at 1279 ("[T]here is wisdom in recognizing that the fur-
ther the tribunal is removed from the agency and thus from any suspicion of bias, the less may be 
the need for other procedural safeguards."). 
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basis of the decision to the evidence presented at the hearing,384 it 
functions as "a powerful preventive of wrong decisions"38' and inhib-
its reliance upon irrelevant or prejudicial considerations. Docu-
menting the basis for a judgment protects the accused from the stigma 
created by false conjecture about the reasons for the official action386 
and forms an essential element of any subsequent review, judicial or 
administrative.387 Written decisions create a body of precedent, and 
foster consistency between cases.388 Finally, a written statement of 
reasons furthers the perception of procedural fairness and may make 
the outcome more understandable to the parties involved.389 Because 
written statements provide the accused significant procedural protec-
tions at a marginal cost to the state, due process demands that the 
states require agencies to issue such statements in child abuse 
proceedings. 
G. Counsel 
The Court has been reluctant to impose a right to counsel in ad-
ministrative hearings, principally out of concern that the introduction 
of lawyers will complicate greatly what otherwise would be a simple 
proceeding. 390 Retention of counsel by the accused will undoubtedly 
lead the state agency to engage its own attorney. Once placed in an 
adversarial setting, the lawyers will " 'present all available evidence 
and arguments . . . contest with vigor all adverse evidence and 
views,' " 391 and "caus[e] delay and sow[] confusion,"392 all in the 
name of zealous pursuit of their clients' interests. This would produce 
a prolonged and vastly more expensive hearing process that would tax 
unnecessarily the agency and the accused alike.393 Consequently, the 
Court rarely has read the Due Process Clause to impose a general 
right to counsel in administrative proceedings.394 
The Court has conceded that, in some instances, professional rep-
384. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 565; Morrisey, 408 U.S. at 487; Goldberg, 391 U.S. at 271; 
Friendly, supra note 148, at 1292. 
385. Friendly, supra note 148, at 1292. 
386. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 565 ("Written records of proceedings will thus protect the inmate 
against collateral consequences based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the original 
proceeding."). 
387. Friendly, supra note 148, at 1292. 
388. See id. 
389. See id. 
390. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 419 U.S. 539, 569-70 (1974); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 
U.S. 778, 787-88 (1973); see also Friendly, supra note 148, at 1287-88. 
391. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 569 (quoting Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787). 
392. Friendly, supra note 148, at 1288. 
393. But see Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271 ("We do not anticipate that this assistance will unduly 
prolong or otherwise encumber the hearing."). 
394. See Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 332-34 (1985); 
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 
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resentation is necessary to provide procedural due process. 395 The 
Court has insisted on evaluating the right to counsel on a case-by-case 
basis, however, based on the private interests at stake, the nature of 
the administrative proceeding, and the argumentative capabilities of 
the particular claimant. 396 It has refused to grant a general right to 
counsel to even relatively disadvantaged groups, such as prison in-
mates397 and indigent parents fighting to retain custody of their 
children. 398 
Under these standards, the overwhelming majority of child care 
workers would not enjoy a right to counsel in child abuse proceedings. 
First, the Court has suggested that the Due Process Clause confers a 
right to counsel only when the government action deprives a citizen of 
physical liberty or the means of daily subsistence. 399 The individual's 
interests in employment and livelihood implicated by employer-acces-
sible child abuse registries are important but do not rise to this level. 
Second, most child care workers are capable of competently defending 
themselves in an administrative proceeding.400 The fact that "a lawyer 
might have done more" with the available evidence is insufficient to 
secure a right to counsel. 401 Hence, the Due Process Clause does not 
require states to permit child care workers to be represented by coun-
sel at child abuse hearings. 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps too little has been said here about the importance of pro-
tecting children from abusive adults, about the breadth of this problem 
in our society, and about the irreparable harms which children suffer 
when they are subjected to such mistreatment. This Note has not in-
tended to demean these problems or to belittle well-intentioned gov-
ernment efforts to eradicate them, but rather to illuminate the 
structure that the Constitution mandates for resolving the inevitable 
U.S. 308, 314-15 (1976); Wolff. 418 U.S. at 569-70; Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787-88. But see Vitek v. 
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1980); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270-71. 
395. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 788; cf. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270 ("'The right to be beard would 
be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.' " 
(quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932))). 
396. See, e.g., Walters, 473 U.S. at 332-34; Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32-33. 
397. See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 315; Wolff. 418 U.S. at 569-70; Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787. But see 
Vitek. 445 U.S. at 496-97 (granting prison inmates the right to counsel in proceedings to deter-
mine their mental competency). 
398. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32. 
399. See Walters, 473 U.S. at 333 (distinguishing Goldberg); Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31 (stating 
presumption "that there is no right to appointed counsel in the absence of at least a potential 
deprivation of physical liberty"). 
400. See Eileen Ogintz, Low Wages, Turnover Hurting Day-Care Kids, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 22, 
1992, § 3, at 1 (reporting that many child care workers have some college training). 
401. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 33. 
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conflicts between individual liberties and collective goals and to accen-
tuate the need to adhere to that structure. 
Virtually all government efforts to restrict employment arise be-
cause of goals that society desperately wishes to achieve. These objec-
tives range from protecting the national security,402 to ensuring the 
integrity of the legal system, 403 to controlling the availability of intoxi-
cating substances. 404 Whether observers condemn these measures as 
"blacklists" and "witch hunts"405 or endorse them as natural and nec-
essary aspects of the police power depends largely upon the perceived 
fairness of the government's methods and the degree of respect for the 
rights of the accused that they express. 
The due process difficulties associated with the use of child abuse 
registries do not stem primarily from an insensitivity to individual lib-
erties. Instead, they represent the "growing pains" of child abuse reg-
istry statutes.406 The contents of child abuse registries were originally 
available only to researchers and state agencies, making strong proce-
dural safeguards unnecessary. Recently, though, states have turned 
their registries into implements of employment screening for the child 
care industry, thereby imposing harsh sanctions on child care workers 
appearing therein. Legislatures have accomplished this transforma-
tion by amending existing statutes without adequate consideration of 
the enhanced implications for the accused that result from such a 
change.407 The resulting laws pursue the worthy goal of isolating po-
tentially dangerous individuals from contact with children, but they 
fail to afford the degree of procedural protection that the Due Process 
Clause demands. 
This Note seeks to rehabilitate rather than reprimand. It has been 
said that "[t]he essence of justice is largely procedural."408 By follow-
ing this maxim, states can achieve justice both for children and for 
their adult caretakers. If states desire to use their child abuse regis-
tries as occupational blacklists, they must reevaluate and strengthen 
their administrative procedures to comply with the Due Process 
Clause. By enacting the procedures described herein, states can create 
a system of employment screening that sufficiently protects children 
from abuse and child care workers from unwarranted persecution. 
402. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text. 
403. See supra notes 165-76 and accompanying text. 
404. See supra notes 140-48 and accompanying text. 
405. The procedural deficiencies described herein have provoked several commentators to 
apply such labels to child abuse proceedings. See RICHARD A. GARDNER, SEX ABUSE HYSTE· 
RIA: SALEM WITCH TRIAIS REVISITED (1991); WEXLER, supra note 271, at 300-02; Press et 
al., supra note 332, at 75 (words of Prof. Uelmen). 
406. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. 
407. See, e.g., Beaty & Woolley, supra note 9, at 671-82 (recounting legislative history of 
Pennsylvania's child abuse registry statute). 
408. Davis, supra note 94, at 274. 
